Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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when officials in Washington and later in Seoul claimed to have no knowl-

edge or biographical information on Chun Doo Hwan, who they referred to

as a “previously unknown officer.” He was indeed quite well known, espe-

cially within the intelligence community, and had associated with embassy

officers such as Colonel Hiebert for at least eight years.

Activities of Other Military Attachés

My duties also included maintaining liaison with the other military attachés

from various countries assigned to Korea. There were about twenty other

countries that had such officers accredited to Seoul, and we met together

frequently. Most of this contact was social, for few of the other attachés had

much interest in the Korean situation and were involved more in represen-

tational duties such as social events and parades than in the substance of

the military situation. There were, however, two exceptions. Both the Ger-

man attaché and the Japanese attaché worked very hard to understand the

situation, particularly after October, when President Park was assassinated.

The Japanese Army attaché was Col. Ahiro Hagino, who was very compe-

tent, spoke excellent Korean, and had a strong background in Korean mili-

tary and political affairs. He later became a three-star general and after

retirement continued to work closely with Korea as a businessman. I had

great respect for Colonel Hagino’s professional capabilities, having worked

with him several years before while on the Northeast Asia Desk in Wash-

ington. I had better sources of information on North Korea, but I rated his

knowledge of South Korea as equal to my own. During the crisis period of

late  and , we would see much of each other as we attempted to

piece together the true picture of events.

Denouement of the Troop-Withdrawal Issue

The most momentous event of my third tour in Korea prior to the assassi-

nation of President Park was President Carter’s visit in late June, . By

that time we were reasonably hopeful that Carter would reverse his policy

on troop withdrawal. We had busied ourselves with plans for the visit for

many weeks in anticipation that its outcome might have a substantial in-

fluence on policy.^1

Carter landed in Seoul on June  and immediately helicoptered to Camp

Casey near the DMZ, where he was briefed by General Vessey and mingled

with American troops of the d Division. He did not meet President Park