• until the next day, and their first encounter was nearly a disaster. Against
strong U.S. advice, Park began the meeting by sternly admonishing his guest
on his withdrawal policy.^2 Carter, who had a bad impression of Park to be-
gin with based on his human rights record and military background, grew
angry with the lengthy lecture. His jaw grew tense, and at one time he grew
so angry that he considered threatening to remove all U.S. forces from Ko-
rea if Park continued. This meeting did nothing to improve the situation.
The two presidents then met privately for a few minutes, but again with-
out any improvement in the atmosphere; if anything, their mutual distrust
only increased. When word of this calamity reached us in the embassy, we
were afraid that all the carefully laid plans of PRM- and the long efforts
to change President Carter’s mind had been in vain.
Upon returning from the unpleasant confrontation at the Blue House,
Secretaries Vance and Brown, National Security Adviser Brzezinski, and
Ambassador Gleysteen rode in the same large limousine with President
Carter. After reaching the ambassador’s residence, where several embassy
staffers, including myself, and some press were waiting, the car stopped, but
no one got out (greatly frustrating the aide whose job, rehearsed often over
the preceding days, was to open the president’s automobile door). Inside
the car there was a heated discussion. Carter directly asked each of his top
advisers if they disagreed with his policy. At first nobody replied. Sensing
that his top advisers were reluctant to disagree with Carter, Ambassador
Gleysteen finally took the initiative. “Yes, Mr. President, I disagree,” he said.
He then explained directly to Carter’s face why he thought the policy was
wrong, citing factors such as the overall U.S. commitment to security in East
Asia, the effect withdrawal would have on Japan, Chinese concerns, and
other major diplomatic factors. After he finished, Vance and Brown, who
by now had been convinced by their staffs that withdrawal was not a good
idea, supported Gleysteen’s remarks. Only Brzezinski remained silent.^3
From this point on, the American side was engaged at putting the best
possible face on the earlier meeting with President Park. We redrafted the
joint ROK-U.S. communiqué, emphasizing the points on which the two presi-
dents had agreed and purposely leaving out the several points of disagree-
ment. Secretaries Vance and Brown, accompanied by Ambassador
Gleysteen, paid official calls on their Korean counterparts, trying to play
down any damage done by the presidential meetings and to ensure that
there would be smooth interaction between Park and Carter during that
evening’s state dinner. This effort succeeded, and the state dinner went off
without a hitch.