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Sung Hwa. The caller asked if I knew any more details, which, of course, I
did not. I hung up the phone but it rang again immediately. This time it was
a call for Brewster from his duty officer, who urgently requested to talk to
him. I explained that he had just left and was probably en route to his home
at the embassy compound number two, near Kwanghwamun. Just after I
hung up, the phone rang once again. This time it was Brewster’s deputy,
who also asked for Bob. We discussed briefly what we knew about the situ-
ation, which was not much. Since normal procedure was to report to the
Yongsan bunker in the case of an emergency, we decided to go there imme-
diately.In the BunkerThe USFK command bunker was located only about five minutes from my
residence. When I arrived there were only a few officers present, together
with the normal “watch” personnel whose duties were to observe and track
the military situation twenty-four hours a day. To my knowledge, General
Wickham and Ambassador William Gleysteen arrived about the same time
and went to a separate section of the bunker.
The Yongsan bunker was somewhat old and outdated compared with the
more technically sophisticated facilities now used. A portion of the bunker
was devoted to office space, but the important sections were the operations
and intelligence center and a separate section toward the rear, which was
normally reserved for senior commanders and staff. The operations and in-
telligence center contained the “Red” North Korea forces display and was
the place where all intelligence relating to these forces was gathered, ana-
lyzed, and acted upon as necessary. The other room held the “Blue,” or
friendly, forces information and contained a large map of the DMZ.
Upon arrival I talked for a few moments with the watch officer, primarily
to determine if there was any unusual activity going on in North Korea. He
replied that there was not, that everything was normal but that our forces
were increasing their watchfulness because of the confusing situation in
Seoul. I then called Colonel Blottie, alerted him to the situation, and rec-
ommended that he report to the bunker as soon as possible.
When Blottie arrived, I briefed him on the situation as we knew it, which
was that there were some ROK troop movements, the details of which were
still unclear, that Chun Doo Hwan had apparently arrested Chung Sung
Hwa, and that in my judgment there was likely some sort of military coup
occurring. We then entered the special separate section of the bunker in