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Ambassador Gleysteen were concerned that the North might try to take ad-
vantage of the situation.
General Wickham was especially surprised and incensed at the movement
of CFC forces during the night, particularly those assigned to sensitive DMZ
duty. At one point he called the American three-star commander at
Uijongbu to confirm that Korean troops under his operational control had
moved without notification. After checking with his ROK Army counter-
parts, the Uijongbu commander initially reported that all forces were in
place. This was not true, of course, and it left General Wickham with a false
impression of the actual situation. A short time later this report was changed
to state that several units had indeed moved toward the Seoul area. Nor-
mally a mild-mannered and controlled person, Wickham’s face grew red,
and he was visibly angered as the truth of these reports became evident.
To this point the embassy staff and ambassador had been primarily ob-
servers. Ambassador Gleysteen had earlier tried to reach President Choi by
telephone, though without success. He now called the State Department for
“consultations” and was on the phone several times with Assistant Secre-
tary of State Richard Holbrooke.
The primary diplomatic concern was that the power play by Chun would
set back the democratization process. The State Department was also con-
cerned about civil unrest and even civil war in the ROK, not to mention the
possibility that North Korea would try to take advantage of the situation.
After several consultations, a statement was drafted as follows:During the past few weeks we had been encouraged by the orderly proce-
dures adopted in the Republic of Korea to develop a broadly based govern-
ment following the assassination of President Park. As a result of events
today in Korea we have instructed our Ambassador and the Commander of
U.S. Forces in Korea to point out to all concerned that any forces within the
Republic of Korea which disrupt this progress should bear in mind the seri-
ously adverse impact their actions would have on the ROK’s relations with
the United States. At the same time, any forces outside the ROK which might
seek to exploit the current situation in Seoul should bear in mind our warn-
ing of October .^3From a practical standpoint, this statement had almost no effect. Since
the embassy had no control over the local media, which were controlled by
the ROK military, the only course of action was to release the statement in
Washington. Few if any people in Seoul were ever aware of the position of