⁄ • the U.S. government, a condition that would continue and even grow worse
during the days ahead. Indeed, to the average Korean, it even appeared that
the United States was actually favoring the renegade generals since there
was no evidence of disapproval expressed in the Korean media.
By now it was becoming obvious that there was very little new informa-
tion coming into the bunker because of the lack of communication with
ROK forces. I proposed to Colonel Blottie that I personally investigate the
situation at the Ministry of Defense and perhaps the Blue House as well and
then send a report to our Washington headquarters. He agreed and I pre-
pared to depart.
I left the room just as ROK minister of defense Rho Jae Hyun and Joint
Chiefs of Staff chairman Gen. Kim Chong Hwan entered the bunker. They
both were pale and nervous; General Kim walked in front of Minister Rho,
which was unusual. They entered the situation room and joined General
Wickham and the ambassador, spending most of the rest of the evening
trying to contact units loyal to MND. To my knowledge, this was only par-
tially successful, and Minister Rho eventually decided to return to MND.
General Wickham and Ambassador Gleysteen both objected strenuously to
this idea out of concern for Roh’s safety and a feeling that he would prob-
ably be captured or arrested if he left the USFK bunker. As it turned out, he
was unharmed but was later persuaded to sign a statement authorizing the
arrest of Chung Sung Hwa almost twelve hours after the actual event had
taken place. Rho resigned the following day.
When I departed the bunker for MND, the roads were almost deserted. It
was possible to drive past the MND building, but the entrances were blocked
by soldiers and combat vehicles. I was told to leave immediately by a young
soldier who looked like he meant business, and I complied. Driving north
toward Seoul Station, I took note of the bumper numerals on the vehicles.
ROK Army units, unlike their American counterparts, which had their unit
designation printed on their vehicles, used a numbered code. Fortunately I
knew the code for most of the major ROK units and could quickly ascertain
that these vehicles were from a CFC front-line division. I reported this infor-
mation to the bunker via my car radio and continued downtown toward
the embassy.
On arrival near the embassy, I decided to see if there was any unusual
military activity in the Blue House vicinity, but the normal entrance was
blocked. This was not unusual, of course, since security around the Blue
House was always tight, but that night the security appeared greater than
usual. I then drove to the Kwanghwamun area, but instead of turning back