Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

(Dana P.) #1

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toward the embassy, I decided at the last minute to drive by the area of Gen.
Chun Doo Hwan’s Defense Security Command headquarters.
This was a big mistake. The area was heavily guarded, with armored
vehicles and even tanks around. I was stopped by two armed guards in full
combat gear and told quite clearly to leave the area immediately. As I turned
around I was greatly surprised to see the Japanese attaché walking rapidly
from the area of the roadblock back toward his embassy. We did not have a
chance to stop and talk, but seeing him convinced me again that the Japa-
nese must have had excellent sources of information and probably knew as
much or more about the situation as we did.
My job as an attaché was to report to the Defense Intelligence Agency
and the Defense Department items of military significance. We now had
unfolding probably the most important event involving the Korean military
in almost twenty years, and although the State Department was being in-
formed and USFK was in continuing contact with the operational chain of
command, nothing had as yet come through my channel. My headquar-
ters would be expecting information from the attaché office soon, so I went
to the embassy and called in a telephonic report to the National Military
Intelligence Center. I then prepared a follow-up written report, which is
partially paraphrased as follows:

On the evening of December , Army Chief of Staff and Martial Law
Commander General Chung Sung Hwa was arrested by forces under the con-
trol of DSC Commander Major General Chun Doo Hwan. There was fighting
during the arrest, which occurred at the Chief of Staff’s official residence,
and some casualties resulted. Chung is presently in custody and is allegedly
being questioned in connection with his role during the Presidential assassi-
nation of  ⁄. There have also been significant troop movements by forces
loyal to both the Chief of Staff and General Chun. Some of these forces ap-
pear to be units under the OPCON [operational control] of CFC, and include
elements of several front-line divisions. These activities appear to be restricted
to Army units; there is no indication of Air Force or Navy involvement.
As of  local time, we cannot confirm further clashes between ROK
Army units but believe the worst is behind us. Visual inspection of areas
surrounding DSC Headquarters and MND confirm combat troop presence
and armored vehicles. Blue House appears normal. Embassy and USFK are
reporting events as they happen in their channels.
If Chun and his followers are successful, and it now appears that they
have been, they are in a position to take effective control of the Army. The
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