⁄ • I gave him an honest and straightforward answer, that in the immediate
and near term, it had damaged our countries’ relations quite badly. Over
the longer term, however, our common interests in the security of the Ko-
rean peninsula and in ensuring stability following / would dictate that
we work together as harmoniously as possible. I was told that the portion
of the th Division that moved into Seoul was the division’s reserve regi-
ment, not a unit that was on DMZ duty. This was, of course, an attempt to
minimize the importance of what had happened in that regard. I replied that
his distinction in our view did not excuse the illegal and unauthorized use
of those forces that were diverted from their legitimate military duty and
used for domestic political purposes. I also stated my opinion that any fu-
ture such incident was unthinkable. He asked about General Wickham’s
reaction, and I told him that the general was very disappointed and could
probably be expected to make his views known directly to the appropriate
authorities in the very near future. We chatted a few more minutes before
he departed to return to his headquarters. By now I had not slept in the last
two days, so I took a warm shower and tried to sleep for a few hours.
Ambassador Gleysteen Meets with President ChoiBy the morning of December , Ambassador William Gleysteen had been
successful in his attempts to contact President Choi and had arranged a
meeting that same day. After exchanging the usual pleasantries, Gleysteen
stated to Choi that he wished to express the views of the U.S. government
concerning the present situation. The ambassador then made two major
points. First, he stressed the need for civilian control of the armed forces and
pointed out the dangers of an independent military not responsible to a
higher authority. Second, he expressed the U.S. government’s strong sup-
port for the ongoing program of political liberalization. In this regard
Gleysteen gave the longstanding U.S. view that only widespread and direct
participation by the Korean people in the political process could ensure true
stability of the ROK, that further interference by the military in this process
could only have a negative effect. The meeting ended cordially, and the am-
bassador left, expressing his appreciation for having been granted the ap-
pointment on such short notice and hopeful that his words would encourage
the desired results.^2
In private, though, Ambassador Gleysteen was not optimistic. When he
returned to the embassy, he drafted a message to Washington reporting the
substance of the meeting in a straightforward manner. The tone of the