Eye on Korea_ An Insider Account of Korean-American Relations

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report was very pessimistic and expressed serious doubt that the Choi gov-

ernment had either the will or the power to control the army.

In Washington the same day, Assistant Secretary of State Richard

Holbrooke met with the ROK ambassador to convey a similar message. The

American view of that meeting was that the Korean ambassador himself

was either not yet fully mindful of the total implications of the / events

or had received no instructions. Either way, he accepted the concerns ex-

pressed by Holbrooke without much comment and indicated that the con-

versation would be reported to Seoul.

Chun Doo Hwan Purges the Army

On December  sweeping changes were announced in the ROK Army hi-

erarchy. Officers loyal to Chun were placed in key commands and staff posi-

tions, particularly in those units that were politically sensitive and might

have the capability to launch an attempt at a countercoup. For example,

th Division commander Major General Roh became commander of the

Capital Defense Command, which included most of the combat forces in the

Seoul area, and other classmates or trusted officers were placed in command

of the Special Warfare Command, Third ROK Army, and several other units.

In turn, these new commanders ensured that officers loyal to themselves

were placed in command of subordinate regiments and battalions. Officers

from Korean Military Academy Classes  and  moved ahead of their se-

niors in certain key staff positions as well. Widespread and wholesale retire-

ments were ordered by the end of the month, especially among Class 

officers. It was clear that the army was being purged and that Chun and his

followers would now be in total effective control.

To my way of thinking, the events of December  were more significant

than those of December  for at least three reasons. First was the consoli-

dation of the army under Chun’s control. Second and more importantly,

these actions provided the first indication that Chun might have more on

his mind than simply carrying out his investigatory responsibilities under

martial law. After all, if his intention on / had been only to investigate

President Park’s assassination, why was it necessary to take complete con-

trol of the army? Third, it was confirming evidence, if indeed any was nec-

essary by now, that the Choi government was incapable of exerting control

over the new army leadership. Clearly Ambassador Gleysteen’s meeting with

President Choi had had no positive effect. From that point on it was obvious

that civilian control of the military was a pipedream.