⁄ • pression that he was not as angry as the words implied. He also stressed the
importance of maintaining constitutional order and continuing the demo-
cratic reforms that would result in political liberalization.
Chun listened carefully and then addressed the ambassador’s points one
by one. The events of /, he said, were accidental. He had never intended
that the situation would become as complicated as it had, and the troop
movements had not been preplanned but merely an outgrowth of his ar-
rest of General Chung, which he saw as his duty. He expressed support of
President Choi and the legitimate constitutional order, saying also that the
division in the ROK Army was temporary and would be strengthened by the
changes that were being made in the command structure that same day.
He also denied any personal ambitions outside the army.
This meeting remained somewhat controversial even after it was finished.
From the American perspective, we could now send a cable to Washington
indicating that Chun had heard directly from the ambassador of our deep
concerns and had been suitably warned and American concerns “put on
the record.” But I believe that in retrospect the meeting was more useful to
Chun than to the United States. This was because Chun was now able to go
back to his supporters and say that he had personally met with the U.S.
ambassador and that his explanation of events had been understood and
accepted. Of course it was true that his reasons had been understood, but
they certainly were not accepted. Nonetheless, Chun used this meeting to
suggest to his followers and others that the U.S. Embassy was now not op-
posed to his power move; perhaps he even implied that the United States
supported him. In the days ahead, many Koreans approached me and other
embassy staff asking if it were true that the U.S. government now supported
Chun, and if not, why had Chun and Ambassador Gleysteen had such a
“cozy” meeting? The fact that the meeting had taken place had unfortu-
nately become more important than what was said at it, especially given
the inability of the U.S. Embassy to get its message out to the public through
the government-controlled Korean media.
Chun also requested a meeting with General Wickham, presumably to
discuss and justify the / movements of CFC units and other issues. Se-
rious debate occurred as to whether Wickham should agree to this. Most
of his staff believed he should, but the embassy was opposed, arguing that
the meeting should be refused in order to demonstrate U.S. anger over the
/ seizure of power. Ambassador Gleysteen personally requested that
Wickham not meet with Chun. After some discussion, Wickham assented
to the embassy’s request.