⁄ • Fortunately the Defense Department strongly and forcefully opposed this
course of action, arguing that such withdrawal was neither in the interest
of South Korea nor the United States, for both had a strong requirement to
maintain stability and peace on the Korean peninsula. For the same rea-
son, a threat to engage in troop withdrawal would probably lack credibility
with the new military leadership. Also, if carried out, force reduction would
pose an unacceptable risk that might encourage North Korean provocations.
Therefore, although it was briefly considered, troop withdrawal, either in
full or in part, was discarded as a viable option.
More serious consideration was given to cancellation or postponement
of the annual security consultative meeting. These bilateral gatherings were
an important symbol of U.S. commitment to the ROK and could be canceled
as a way of demonstrating disapproval without having the more serious
effect that might result from an actual troop withdrawal. Accordingly, this
option had more support.
Again, however, the Defense Department was strongly opposed to can-
celing or postponing the annual meeting. With lingering memories of the
recent struggle over troop withdrawal, they made an aggressive argument
that it was a mistake to link security policy with our political objectives to
expand democracy in Korea. The Defense Department also argued that this
critical period in South Korea demanded that we show solidarity in a mili-
tary sense. Anything that detracted from that, even if it were primarily only
a demonstration of disapproval rather than a concrete action, would be
detrimental to our security interests both in Korea and East Asia. In the end,
the security-consultative-meeting option was also rejected.
Economic sanctions were considered as well. But support for this alterna-
tive was weak across the board. The consensus of opinion was that sanctions
would result in even more authoritarian policies. The ROK’s economic situa-
tion was somewhat unsteady at the time.^6 It was felt that any actions that
would make the situation worse would likely cause additional social unrest,
more demonstrations, and ultimately result in an even more severe crack-
down by the military. Further, sanctions were generally considered to be in-
appropriate between allies. Economic sanctions were discarded as an option.
Despite having ruled out three strong options, the consensus was that
the U.S. government still needed to express its views forcefully and at the
highest level. To this end, it was recommended that President Carter send a
letter to President Choi that would express concern at the events of Decem-
ber as strongly as possible. This communication was forwarded in early
January, , and expressed support for democratic reform and political