Financial Times Europe - 21.02.2020

(Tina Sui) #1
Friday21 February 2020 ★ FINANCIAL TIMES 9

Opinion


F


or years, big technology com-
panies have acted as though
they were above the law. More
people useMicrosoft, Face-
bookorAmazonthan the pop-
ulations of most countries. Their profits
exceed the budgets of many states.
Tech and social media companies
have become powerful global actors and
their corporate governance decisions
already affect the rights and freedoms of
billions of people. But, tech companies
are now going a step further, by posi-
tioning themselves as governments.
Last month, Microsoft announced it
would open a “representation to the
UN”, while at the same time recruiting a
diplomat to run its European public
affairs office.Alibabahas proposed a
cross-border, online free trade plat-
form. When Facebook’s suggestion of a
“supreme court” to revisit controversial
content moderation decisions was criti-
cised, it relabelled the initiative an
“oversight board”. It seems tech execu-
tives are literally trying to take seats at
the table that has thus far been shared
by heads of state.
At the annual security conference in
Munich, presidents, prime ministers
and politicians usually share the sought-
after stage to engage in conversations
about conflict in the Middle East, the
future of the EU, or transatlantic rela-
tions. This year, executives of Alphabet,
Facebook and Microsoft were added to
the speakers list.
Facebook bossMark Zuckerberg
went on from Munich to Brussels to
meet with EU commissioners about a
package of regulatory initiatives n arti-o
ficial intelligence, data and digital serv-

ices. Commissioner Thierry Breton pro-
vided the apt reminder that companies
must follow EU regulations — not the
other way around. But making sure EU
lawmakers stay in the driver’s seat will
require significant catching up.
Tech executives ho initially resistedw
regulation nowcall it desirable. As long
as regulations serve their interests,
companies support them. Large tech
companies have found regulations can
help consolidating their market posi-
tion, while smaller enterprises struggle.
Apple supports global privacy regula-
tions, Microsoftpushes restrictions ni
the use of facial recognition technolo-
gies, and Facebook looks to govern-
ments to regulate content online.
But self-serving proposals should be
distinguished from laws to ensure
democracy is not disrupted. It is impor-
tant not to take the words of Silicon Val-
ley leaders at face value.
For one, the suggestion that regula-
tions are the main drivers of corporate
governance is misleading. It distracts
from the power tech companies have in
setting norms and standards them-
selves. Through their business models
and innovations, they develop rules on
speech, access to information and com-
petition.
If tech executives want change, there
is no need to wait for government regu-
lation to guide them in the right direc-
tion. They can start in their own “repub-
lics” today. As regulators of the domains
they govern, nothing stops them proac-
tively aligning their terms of use with
human rights, democratic principles
and the rule of law. When they deploy
authoritarian models of governing, they
should be called out.
Instead of playing government, they
should take responsibility for their own
territories. This means anchoring terms
of use and standards in the rule of law
and democratic principles and allowing
independent scrutiny from researchers,
regulators and democratic representa-
tives alike. Credible accountability is
always independent. It is time to ensure
such oversight is proportionate to the
power of tech giants.
Companies seeking to democratise
would also have to give their employees
and customers more of a say, as prime
“constituents”. If leaders are serious
about their state-like powers, they must
walk the walk and treat consumers as
citizens. Until then, calls for regulations
will be seen as opportunistic, and corpo-
rations unfit to lead.

The writer is international policy director
at Stanford’s Cyber Policy Center

Technology


companies


want to act like


governments


If executives are serious
about their state-like

powers, they must treat


consumers as citizens


in such criticisms. French presidents
have a habit of breaking crockery. Ms
Merkel’s responses, though, offered
nothing in the way of engagement.
Instead of presenting its own plans, Ber-
lin shuffled and stalled. Those listening
carefully to Mr Steinmeier’s Munich
speech would perhaps have detected a
hint of sympathy for Mr Macron.
Maybe the chancellor did want to pre-
serve EU unity. More cynically, she was
anxious to avoid anything that might
destabilise her domestic position. The
irony is that she now looks weaker than
ever, with no guarantee she will survive
in office beyond this year.
Only last month Ms Merkel, in an
interview in the Financial Times,
described the EU as Germany’s “life
insurance”. Her answer to US disengage-
ment? “We in Europe, and especially in
Germany, need to take on more respon-
sibility.” This is what she could have
done in 2018. The moment has passed.
The hesitation — the absence of leader-
ship — will now define her legacy.

[email protected]

Think back to the spring of 2018. The
two leaders had political space and capi-
tal. Mr Macron was still in the first flush
of his 2017 presidential victory. After a
difficult period, Ms Merkel had assem-
bled a coalition tounderwrite her fourth
term. She had long complained of the
absence of a “serious” partner. Now she
had one. Both had seen enough of Mr
Trump to know that Europe had to take
charge of its own affairs. The EU needed
to start building an economic union to
underwrite the euro and to develop its
own foreign and security policies as the
US stepped back — all the while manag-
ing the combustible Mr Trump.
Nothing happened. Mr Macron
launched his initiatives. Ms Merkel bur-
ied them in the sand, occasionally con-
ceding a tiny step forward when the
pressure became embarrassing. Mr
Macron was dressing up French projects
in European clothes, her officials would
snipe. There was too much hot air, and
not enough gritty policy detail. Paris
was careless of smaller EU states. Ger-
man voters did not want grand schemes.
There may well have been some truth

resided in a shared effort to overcome
entrenched disagreements. No longer.
The clash came to a head in November
at a dinner hosted by the German Presi-
dent Frank-Walter Steinmeier. The
angry exchanges,first reported by the
New York Times, were, by the account
of witnesses, extraordinary.
Ms Merkel complained bitterly that
she spent all her time gluing back
together crockery broken by the presi-
dent’s pursuit of his grandiose projects.
Mr Macron’s equally sharp response was
that each effort he had made to raise
Europe’s sights to the global challenges
was met with silence or obstructionism.
They had had a precious opportunity to
work together. Now, Mr Macron saw lit-
tle purpose in engaging someone who
had run out of political road at home.

elevate their sovereignty above taking
instruction from Washington. At least
Mr Trump, I found myself thinking
while listening to this shallow bombast,
is honest in his bigotry.
US senators and members of the
House of Representatives turned out in
force — the Democrats scarcely hiding
fears that their party may hand Mr
Trump a second term by choosing a can-
didate who cannot win; internationally-
minded Republicans half-apologising
for US foreign policy. Unless I misheard
him, Lindsey Graham, the senator for
South Carolina often seen on our televi-
sion screens defending Mr Trump,
heaped praise on the distinctly
unTrumpian notion of multilateralism.
If Europe’s differences with the White
House are routinely played out in pub-
lic, the relationship that has really
soured is that between Paris and Berlin.
Age and temperament have always mili-
tated against the idea of Ms Merkel and
France’s Emmanuel Macron as soul-
mates. They could have been partners.
Instead, the relationship has broken
down. Mr Macron, taking to the stage in
Munich, showed impatience and frus-
tration with the inertia that nowadays
passes as Germany’s foreign policy. Ms
Merkel was at once physically absent
and omnipresent — her precarious hold
on power the subject of excited gossip in
every conference corner. Politically
beleaguered, she exudes contempt for
Mr Macron’s supposed grandstanding.
German and French leaders rarely
start with the same worldview — the
strength of the fabled axis has always

H


istory is alert to sins of
commission — big choices
with bad consequences
that leaders come bitterly
to regret. Think of the Iraq
war. Sometimes, though, the mistake
takes the form of a hesitation — a deci-
sion deferred, a choice put aside. These
sins of omission are harder to spot, but
often every bit as wrecking in their
impact. Germany’s chancellor Angela
Merkel has something to think about in
this respect.
This month’sMunich Security Con-
ference, the annual gathering of inter-
national security elites, focused on the
pervasive sense of drift and fragmenta-
tion in western democracies. “Westless-
ness”, the organisers called it. Think of
the accretion of bad news represented
by US president Donald Trump’s bellig-
erent unilateralism, European power-
lessness in the face of chaos in the Mid-
dle East, Brexit and rising political
extremism in Europe’s democracies
The transatlantic divide was on full
display. Mike Pompeo, the US secretary
of state,delivered a paean to America-
first nationalism. Winning for the west
was all about safeguarding national sov-
ereignty. No one else, however, must

Merkel and


Macron’s fatal


hesitation


German and French
leaders rarely start with

the same worldview, but


this was a missed chance


GLOBAL POLITICS


Philip


Stephens


T


his week US President
Donald Trump has been
crowing about equity
prices. “Highest Stock Mar-
ket in History, By Far!” he
tweeted on Wednesday, after the S&P
500 hit a new record.
That is little surprise, perhaps: the
recent performance of American stocks
does indeed look remarkable, particu-
larly given the coronavirus epidemic in
China and elsewhere. However, if Mr
Trump (or anyone else) wants to get
another perspective, take a look at a
monthly survey that the University of
Michigan conducts to assess consumer
sentiment in stocks.
Its February release suggests that 66
per cent of respondents expect equity
prices to keep rising this year, well
above the 56 per cent reading recorded

in arly 2019e , or 51 per cent in early
2016, ahead of the last election. Indeed,
the current level of bullishness tops
even the optimism seen in early 2007.
This sounds like good news. But there
is a catch: each of the last four times that
optimism levels have exceeded 60 per
cent, equity prices have fallen soon
after, with the decline ranging from 10
per cent in 2018 to 47 per cent in 2008.
“Our indicators tell us, we’re very close
to a Lehman-like drawdown,” argues
Larry McDonald, a former strategist at
Société Générale who now runsThe
Bear Trapsreport newsletter, referring
to the share price fall that followed the
collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008.
Mr Trump would undoubtedly brush
off such historical determinism. But the
survey is not the only sobering indica-
tor. Take the ratio of equity prices to
forward corporate earnings in the S&P
500: this recentlytopped 19 times, its
highest level since the dotcom boom.
Or consider the cyclically-adjusted
P/E ratio, known as the Shiller P/E ratio:
this is currently 31.9, lower than in the
dotcom boom, but well above 2007 lev-
els. More striking still is the ratio of
equity prices to corporate sales in the

S&P 500: this stands at .3 times 2 , even
higher than anything seen last decade.
Of course, such numbers might —
almost — make sense if American busi-
ness is set to boom. And until recently,
most analysts did assume that 2020
would deliver good earnings growth,
after a feeble 2019. But while recent cor-
porate results have been encouraging,
the coronavirus is now causing analysts

to downgrade their 2020 earnings
expectations. “The impact of the coro-
navirus on earnings may well be under-
estimated in current stock prices,” Peter
Oppenheimer, analyst at Goldman
Sachs,warned in a client note this week.
However, there is another crucial
m a r ke t m e t r i c w h i c h m u s t b e
considered since it makes better sense
of current equity levels: relative yields.
Until the 2008 crisis, investors tended to

assume that the dividend yield — divi-
dends as a percentage of the share price
— on equities should be below bond
yields.
However, the yield on 10-year treas-
uries is currently running at a mere 1.
per cent, due to recent US Federal
Reserve rate cuts. That is below the cur-
rent dividend yield on S&P 500 equities
of1.7 per cent. It is dwarfed by the total
earnings yield on equities, which is
around 5 per cent, according to calcula-
tions by Ed Campbell, a strategist at
PGIM asset managers.
This gulf makes it hard for asset man-
agers to stay out of equities, even at sky-
high prices, particularly since many
companies are taking advantage of low
interest rates to issue debt and use the
money to buy back stock. “On most
metrics the equity markets look expen-
sive,” notes Greg Peters, another PGIM
strategist. “The one metric where it is
not true is relative yield.”
To put it another way, if you want to
make sense of American stocks, look at
the behaviour of central banks, not just
the companies themselves. In this con-
text, insofar as the coronavirus out-
break is perceived to be threatening

global growth, it has also made investors
more confident that the low-rate envi-
ronment will last. That’s why “bad”
news on the epidemic has seemed good
for bond and equity prices alike.
Might anything derail this? The major
central banks seem unlikely to change
course anytime soon, given the lack of
any serious inflationary pressure. And
while Mr Trump’s antics have periodi-
cally alarmed investors, causing stock
markets to gyrate, his sabre-rattling is
likely to die down this year. After all, the
president wants to fight the November
election with a soaring stock market
and strong economic data. Hence the
current truce in the US-China trade war.
Amid all the White House trium-
phalism, the key point is this: if you
think that stocks can keep defying his-
torical precedent in 2020, you must also
believe that something fundamental
has changed in the political economy
that will enable central banks to keep
rates ultra low, almost indefinitely.
Maybe this is a reasonable bet; but it is
also very bold. Either way, it needs to be
recognised by investors of all stripes.

[email protected]

The gulf between yields on


stocks and bonds makes it


hard for asset managers to
stay out of equities

Share prices look sky high amid coronavirus fears


FINANCE


Gillian


Tett


Marietje
Schaake

T


he Chinese government is
taking forceful prevention
and control measures in
response to the recent out-
break of the novel coronavi-
rus, known as Covid-19. The contagion
has exerted some downward pressure
on China’s economy, but it will not last
long. Supported by a resilient economy
and ample room for policy adjustments,
the People’s Bank of China expects a
quick recovery after the outbreak is
contained.
Growth is slowing down in the short
run due to the epidemic. Transporta-
tion, tourism and offline shopping have
borne the brunt. Medical care, online
shopping and the internet sectors are
more resilient. Consumption of non-
essential goods will drop temporarily,
but the long-term trend of increased

and upgraded spending remains well on
course. Some small and medium-sized
enterprises are running at partial capac-
ity but have continued paying wages
and other expenses. They face cash flow
pressures at the moment.
Although the financial markets expe-
rienced large-scale corrections when
they reopened after the Spring Festival
holiday, they have rebounded and
stabilised. The sound fundamentals of
China’s economy in the medium and
long term remain unchanged. China has
strong endogenous growth momentum
that is supported by the growing service
sector and by innovation-driven indus-
trial upgrading. These underpinnings of
high-quality growth will not reverse due
to the epidemic.
Meanwhile, China has sufficient pol-
icy space to support steady economic
growth. China is one of the few major
economies in the world that have main-
tained normal monetary policy.
Equipped with a rich policy toolkit,
China is capable of coping with various
uncertainties. Our experience with the
2003 Sars outbreak is very telling.

Thanks to well-targeted provision of
credit to epidemic control and other
measures, China’s economy rebounded
quickly after the virus was brought
under control.
This time, the Chinese government
responded quickly to the outbreak of
the coronavirus epidemic and intro-
duced supportive policies, including fis-
cal and financial measures, which have

helped contain the impact of the out-
break and stabilise economic growth.
The PBoC has strengthened counter-
cyclical adjustments of monetary policy
throughopen market operations. This
has ensured reasonable and adequate
levels of liquidity and helped to boost
market confidence. The PBoC, with
other financial regulators, rolled out 30

policy measures to support enterprises
heavily affected by the epidemic, partic-
ularly small and micro ones, private
enterprises and manufacturing.
The central bank also provided
Rmb300bn in special central bank lend-
ing tolarge banks and selected local
banks in Hubei and other severely-hit
provinces. It provides credit support at
preferential interest rates to manufac-
turers of essential medical supplies and
daily necessities. These policies have
proved significantly effective.
Many SMEs seriously affected by the
epidemic were given access to new bank
loans. Preferential loans to a rapidly-
identified list of eligible enterprises are
receiving fast-track approval. Financial
regulators have also ensured the stable
functioning of markets by ensuring the
uninterrupted operation of financial
infrastructure.
In general, the impact of the coronavi-
rus outbreak on the Chinese economy
will mainly be in the short run. With
strong and effective measures taken by
the Chinese government, the PBoC
expects that the epidemic will gradually

be brought under control, and economic
growth will rebound to its potential out-
put level. As the postponed consump-
tion and investment activities resume,
the economy is expected to experience a
compensatory recovery. The Chinese
economy is expected to recover rapidly
as it is supported by a restart of factories
and inventory replenishment; the most
likely scenario is a V-shaped curve,
which means a decline in economic
activities followed by a rapid recovery,
with the total economic impact rela-
tively contained.
The PBoC will continue to implement
the financial policies designed to sup-
port epidemic prevention and control
efforts, including strengthening coun-
tercyclical adjustment of monetary pol-
icy, adopting structural monetary pol-
icy instruments when necessary, and
ensuring stable functioning of the finan-
cial markets, which we believe will pro-
vide necessary conditions for a post-epi-
demic economic recovery.

The writer is the deputy governor of the
People’s Bank of China

Despite the epidemic,
the country’s sound

fundamentals


remain unchanged


China’s central bank will help the economy rebound quickly


Chen
Yulu

FEBRUARY 21 2020 Section:Features Time: 2/202020/ - 18:15 User:alistair.hayes Page Name:COMMENT USA, Part,Page,Edition:USA , 9, 1

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