1914: THE LAST STAND OF THE THIN RED LINE 111
The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) was also a pathetically small force
in comparison to the juggernauts maneuvering across the fields of France
and Belgium. The Haldane reforms had created a strike force for deployment
in a European conflict, but it was a mere six divisions of infantry and one of
cavalry. At the same time, this small force was thoroughly professional on
the regimental level, and man for man had the best riflemen in the world.^3
The BEF proved its mettle in the opening battles of the 1914 campaign, but
at a terrible cost in manpower and materiel. The shattered regiments that
survived found themselves in an alien environment completely unlike their
colonial experience; few of their enemies, from Afridi to Zulu, had ever
possessed machine guns – much less artillery. As the winter of 1914 closed
in and supplies dried up, the BEF resembled the thin red line of legend,
bewildered and battered, but determined to hold fast.
The Victorian Army died in the mud of Flanders.^4 With it died the
Victorian ideals of heroism. The survivors melted into the ranks of the citizen
soldiers that swarmed the recruiting depots and from that amalgamation and
its commanders came a new heroic paradigm, one suitable to the realities of
barbed wire and poison gas and an industrial society waging total war. For
the time that the thin red line survived, however, the old Victorian heroic
standards remained intact.
The initial British war plan was a simple one that took into consideration
the size and skill of the BEF. Upon a declaration of war, the BEF was to
mobilize in all haste, cross the Channel, and take up a position on the French
left. Pre-war projections envisioned a main German thrust along the Franco-
German frontier; positioning the small but effective British Army on the
flank would allow them the opportunity to deliver the decisive blow at the
proper moment.^5 This deployment plan did not envision a German advance
through the heart of Belgium. For diplomatic reasons the deployment was
carried out despite the change in the strategic situation. The BEF found
itself not in a position to outflank the German right, but rather in a position
to be steam-rolled by the 300,000 men of General Alexander von Kluck’s
First Army.^6
Being hung out to dry for political considerations was nothing new
to the British Army. Despite the lackluster leadership of Sir John French,
his staff saw to the efficient deployment of the BEF along the line of
the Mons Canal by 23 August. The Victorian attitude toward the coming
conflict was summed up in the report penned byThe Timesmilitary corres-
pondent, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Reppington, on the eve of the battle.
He described Mons as ‘glorious country for fighting in, glorious weather,
and a glorious cause. What Soldier could ask for more?’.^7 The ensuing battle
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