140 AWARDED FOR VALOUR
Table 7.2 The cost of courage, 1915: casualties per quarter
Quarter Jan.–Mar. April–June July–Sept. Oct.–Dec. 1915 Total
Total 13 50 39 15 117

Awarded Raw % Raw % Raw % Raw % Raw %

No Wound 8 61 30 60 15 38 9 60 62 53
WIA 2 15 9 18 15 38 2 13 28 24
DOW 1 8 5 10 2 5 2 13 17 14
KIA 2 15 6 12 7 18 2 13 17 14
Total Casualties 5 38 20 40 24 61 6 39 55 47
Total Lethal 3 23 11 22 9 23 4 27 27 23
the majority of 1915 this varied by no more than 6 percent in either
direction. Between 1 January and 31 March officers gathered only 31 percent
of the medals confirmed in that quarter. In the absence of declassified
documents concerning recommendations there really is no way to explain
this aberration; it may just be a statistical fluke.
Eleven percent of the awards earned in 1915 went to men holding a
temporary or acting rank. This is significantly higher than the Victorian
1.7 percent, and represents the increased lethality of the battlefield; more
units, from squads to battalions, were led by men thrust into a command
situation beyond their substantive rank. Most of the awards to temporary
ranks in this early stage of the war went to the lower echelons in both
the officer and other ranks, with three acting lance corporals and second
lieutenants, and two acting lieutenants winning a VC. One acting sergeant,
one acting captain, one acting major and one acting lieutenant colonel
also earned the award. This pattern changed somewhat in 1916. The third
year of the war saw 21 Crosses given to men holding temporary or acting
rank, slightly over 25 percent of the year’s total. The distribution of these
Crosses changed as well, moving up the chain of command: there were
three temporary second lieutenants as in 1915, but here there were four
acting lieutenants and captains, three acting majors and four acting lieutenant
colonels as well. Two acting corporals and one temporary chaplain rounded
out the year.
Statistically, however, it is clear that the Army of 1915 was still trying
to operate in accord with the Victorian heroic model. Modifications to this
model had occurred and the morale of the rank and file was an obvious factor
in the decline of aggressiveness, but the basic core remained intact. The
problem was that the Army was running out of old sweats at an intolerable