HEROISM IN EVOLUTION, 1915–1916 145
Table 7.4 Breakdown of Crosses won, 1915 and 1916 by quarter
Quarter Jan.–Mar. April–June July–Sept. Oct.–Dec. Year Total
1915 13 50 39 15 117
1916 7 25 41 10 83
against the notion that somehow the Kitchener men were more aggressive.
Yet the statistics superficially indicate exactly that.
It is possible that these new troops did not understand the realities of
war and were thus prone to some sort of ‘heroic idiocy,’ rashly pushing
forward where more seasoned soldiers would wait for artillery support or
reinforcement. If this was the case, they managed to conceal their vigor
from their commanding officers. Sir Henry Rawlinson, in charge of the
Somme operations, was convinced the unblooded, poorly-trained soldiers
would disintegrate into panicked knots of men clinging to what scant cover
they could find as soon as they left the trenches.^55 He accordingly issued a
tactical directive that the assault forces on 1 July were to cross no-man’s-
land in line abreast at a steady walk, maintaining an interval of two or three
paces from the next soldier.^56 There may have been some VCs originating
in ignorance, but they could hardly explain the surge of aggressiveness in
the last half of 1916.
The 1916 casualty statistics among VC winners (Table 7.5) certainly
do not support the thesis that the aggression level was due to a lack of
comprehension of combat danger.
The only quarter that might suggest ‘heroic idiocy’ is the period from
April to June, when the big buildup began for the Somme. Thereafter the
Table 7.5 The cost of courage, 1916: casualties per quarter
Quarter Jan.–Mar. April–June July–Sept. Oct.–Dec. Total 1916
725411083

Awarded Raw % Raw % Raw % Raw % Raw %

No Wound 4 57 10 40 22 54 5 50 42 50
WIA 2 29 4 16 10 24 4 40 20 24
DOW 1 14 3 12 2 5 0 0 6 7
KIA 0 0 8 32 7 17 1 10 16 19
Total Casualties 3 43 15 60 19 46 5 50 42 50
Total Lethal 1 14 11 44 9 22 1 10 22 26