HEROISM IN EVOLUTION, 1915–1916 149
He expected the intense artillery preparation would allow the British Fourth
Army to punch through the three lines of the German trenches, at which
point he would pour Hubert Gough’s Reserve Army, heavy with horse
troops, through the breach to capture Arras, 14 miles away.^70
General Sir Henry Rawlinson, commander of the Fourth Army, was not
such a prophet of the great breakout as Haig, and long before the Somme
recorded this evaluation of Haig’s tactics: ‘He expects to get the Cav[alry]
through with the next big push but I very much doubt if he will succeed in
doing more than lose a large number of gallant men without effecting any
great purpose.’^71 This is not to suggest he was not an aggressive commander,
however; his tactical doctrine has been described as ‘bite and hold,’ making
an all-out effort to achieve limited advances to secure a strategic objective,
reinforcing the gain, and then breaking the enemy’s teeth as they try to
recapture the lost strong point.^72 Like Haig, however, he placed great faith
in the power of the artillery, and in his tactical directive at the Somme, put
great emphasis on pressing home the attack.^73
The shift in the nature of heroism sprang in 1916 from the attitude of the
commanders. It has been established in earlier chapters that the commander
in the field and the overall commander of the theater served as a lens through
which the authorities back in London saw heroism. Kitchener had done so
in South Africa, swatting down recommendations he did not consider suffi-
ciently distinguished to merit a Cross, particularly those involving tending
the wounded.^74 Given the indications that the troops of the New Army were
not intrinsically more aggressive than previous formations, that they reacted
to prolonged futile offensives in a similar fashion, and that there was no
substantial change in the battlefield environment, command selectivity in
endorsing recommendations is the only remaining variable.
The trend toward increased aggressiveness as the Battle of the Somme
progressed into its later stages itself supports a command emphasis on
rewarding aggressiveness. The bestowal of honors is the opposite side of the
coin to enforcing discipline when instilling desired behavior in a military
formation.^75 Haig wanted a breakout, and when that goal proved unreach-
able, he had to take enough ground and inflict enough casualties to justify
the casualties his own forces sustained.^76 Neither of these goals required
retrieval of the wounded; they needed soldiers that took the bayonet to the
enemy. Thus, at the same time as we see the total number of awards drop-
ping in the final quarter, the percentage going for aggressive acts reached
its highest point of the year.
There is also evidence that the Army was if not manufacturing, at least
laundering heroes in 1916. It is doubtful there was any sort of quota for
lily
(lily)
#1