EIGHT

‘Courage isn’t what it used to be’: Heroism

Emerges from the Great War, 1917–1918

T

he British Army survived the dubious victories of the Somme
campaign. The Asquith Coalition did not. From its ashes rose the
new coalition of David Lloyd George, with the lean and streamlined
War Cabinet of five men at its heart. The Welshman was an opponent of
Haig and meant to curb what he considered the reckless excesses of the
Western Front.^1 Military circumstances, Allied requirements, and the polit-
ical environment conspired against him, however, placing Haig in an even
more autonomous position than he had enjoyed in 1916.
A side-effect of this struggle between field marshal and prime minister
was to place an increasing importance on Haig’s ideals as regards the nature
of the Victoria Cross. His command both became the center of gravity for
the winning of the war and generated most of the Crosses won during the
war. The primacy of his command gave weight to his pronouncements; the
volume of Crosses passing through his vetting process gave him influence
over the nature of heroism recognized by the government. Haig understood
the usefulness of medals and decorations, that they were not just the rewards
of the valiant but also important tools of command and thus had to be
awarded carefully.
He deemed some acts, though undoubtedly heroic, counter-productive to
the overall war effort and thus refused to recognize them with the Victoria
Cross. The result was a new definition of the VC, one that proved virtually
devoid of human compassion. The machine age finally, fully caught up with
the concept of heroism in 1917, creating a creature very different from its
ancestors.
Lloyd George became prime minister on 7 December 1916 and created
the War Cabinet two days later. This new cabinet had the self-proclaimed
function of taking direct control of the prosecution of the war.^2 Three of
the five members – Lloyd George, Lord Curzon, and Lord Milner – saw
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