HEROISM EMERGES FROM THE GREAT WAR 153
little value in continuing the slaughter on the Western Front for little result,
and advocated a policy of ‘knocking out the props’ of Imperial Germany by
disposing of her allies. Not only would this (they hoped) lower the human
costs of the war, but held the added potential of expanding the Empire in
the process.^3 Haig disagreed vehemently, as in his estimation the Germans
were ready to crack and needed but one more offensive in Flanders to break
them. Waiting on the Western Front would only damage Russian and French
morale, already tenuous, and allow the Germans to shore up their sagging
defenses.^4
It was not that the War Cabinet wanted to abandon the Western Front;
they did not believe that Germany would collapse if the Sultan struck his
tents in Palestine and surrendered, nor did they see Bulgaria as a linchpin of
the Central Powers. They were worried about the damage that continuing
casualty-dense operations on the Western Front would cause to morale at
home and to the power of the Army itself. They were looking not just to
the end of the war, but to the peace that would follow. If Britain wanted
to be a dominant force in forging the treaties that settled the war, they had
to survive the war with an intact army. What they hoped for were some
morale-building victories in the secondary theaters while husbanding their
resources in the West.^5
Circumstances dashed Lloyd George’s hopes. As 1917 progressed, Russia
was wracked by Revolution, French commanders demanded British support
of their planned offensive operations, and the Italian Chief of Staff, General
Cadorna rejected his proposal for a powerful new attack on the Isonzo Front.
With these developments he was forced to endorse offensive operations by
Haig’s command.^6 He tried to place limitations on Haig’s options and tie
his operations to cooperation with the Nivelle Offensive, but Douglas Haig
was not going to take usurpation of his command lightly.
Further frustrating the War Cabinet was a hostile press. Of the major
newspapers, most trusted the pronouncements of the military more than
those of the politicians. Only theDaily Telegraphand theDaily Chroniclecould be
said to be friends of Lloyd George, and their combined circulation could not
match that of the antagonisticTimesorDaily Mail.^7 As a consequence, much
of the reading public was treated to a steady diet of pro-military editorials.
The War Cabinet also faced a distrustful monarchy that had personal ties to
Haig.^8 It is not an accident that Haig’s promotion to field marshal by George
V followed close on the heels of Lloyd George’s move to Downing Street.
The king feared the new prime minister’s power; he and court officials
repeatedly warned Haig and Robertson not to go too far in provoking the
Welshman. Should Haig be forced to resign, ‘Lloyd George, in Wigram’s
lily
(lily)
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