CONCLUSION: THE NEW HERO IN ACTION, 1940–2006 193
daylight the fire-power of a section of three heavy bombers is such as to
deter all but the most determined of enemy fighters. Its speed provides
the enemy with a difficult interception problem. Its range enables it to
outflank the enemy defences and to strike deep into the southern interior
of Germany.^24
Two flights of six Lancasters each made the raid on Augsburg. Nettleton’s
six got chopped up by German fighters near Beaumont-le-Roger, four
destroyed and the other two badly damaged. Nettleton proceeded on to the
target where the two aircraft ran a withering flak gauntlet, costing him a fifth
airplane. The other flight, commanded by Squadron Leader John Seymour
Sherwood, managed to arrive unscathed at Augsburg, but fierce anti-aircraft
fire knocked his and another aircraft down. The raid did manage to place
seventeen 1000-lb bombs on target, five of which failed to explode. This
did considerable structural damage to the assembly plant, but little to the
machinery inside.^25 The raid cost seven of Britain’s newest bombers and
their irreplaceable aircrews.
Harris nominated Nettleton and Sherwood for VCs. Nettleton was recom-
mended without reservation; he had penetrated, struck the target, and
returned. Sherwood was recommended in the same document, but a
marginal note on his portion of the paperwork directed that his recom-
mendation should be reduced to a Distinguished Service Order if it was later
learned that he had survived the crash of his aircraft. He did survive bailing
out and was taken prisoner, and consequently received the DSO.^26
The raid on Augsburg was not particularly effective. It did close down
the motor works for a few days, but Germany had many other plants
manufacturing U-boat engines. The losses, while proportionally large for a
single mission, were not numerically abnormal for RAF bomber operations.
Bomber Command lost 1716 aircraft during 1942, an average of just under
five per day. By November 1942 Air Ministry figures showed that a bomber
crew had only a 44 percent chance of surviving its first tour of duty.^27 Even
during the more limited operations in 1940–41 single-raid losses exceeded
those of Augsburg. For example, a daylight raid on Brest on 24 July 1941
cost 12 aircraft.^28 The factor that generated a VC in this case was neither a
spectacular success nor a horrendous loss; it was Harris’s need to vindicate
deep penetration raids into German airspace. Nettleton was gazetted just 11
days after the raid.
By the Second World War it is clear that the speed with which a recom-
mendation passed through the vetting process was an indicator of the
political or doctrinal importance of certain targets or actions. Every large
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