THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HEROISM IN BRITAIN 31
representatives of parliamentary policy and they answered to the monarch
through the C-in-C. When there was no real divergence between Crown
and parliament on an issue it did not matter, but when the two drew
apart, as they did in the years of reform, it became a political hot topic. By
mid-century the Commander-in-Chief represented one of the last vestiges
of Crown prerogative, a direct link between the monarchy and the Army.^30
The Crown had lost control over the Navy during the eighteenth century,
culminating with the 1831 reorganization of the Admiralty under Sir James
Graham, in which administration of the Royal Navy was vested in an Admir-
alty Board over which the Crown had no formal control.^31 Victoria and
Albert did not want to see the Army suffer the same fate.
On 7 April Grey again attacked the management of the Army, proposing
the creation of a civilian board answering to the Commons to replace
the existing structure.^32 Lord Panmure, who as the Honourable Fox Maule
had been Secretary at War for the Russell Government, roundly supported
Grey’s proposal.^33 In 1850, during debates over officer pay rates he had
circulated a confidential memorandum calling for revamping the Army’s
organization: ‘Let the patronage of the Army be left to the C-in-C and
its strategy to its officers, but let all other matters rest with a responsible
minister of the crown.’^34 Now he had another opportunity to push for
increased parliamentary oversight of the Army. While Grey’s solution to the
problem differed from Panmure’s 1850 proposal, it did offer the potential
to rectify the antiquated administrative problems of the Army. Prince Albert
was horrified by the measure, as it would place the Army, like the Royal
Navy, beyond formal Crown influence.^35
Newcastle responded to the criticism by bluffly maintaining that the
Army’s administration was running like a well-oiled machine – a claim
hardly sustainable in view of its performance – and by invoking the shade
of Wellington to sanctify the existing system. Lord Hardinge, Commander-
in-Chief since Wellington’s resignation, vigorously supported Newcastle’s
assertions and warned that any diminution of the C-in-C’s authority or
changes in the system of military administration would seriously hamper
the war effort.^36
Lord John Russell, Aberdeen’s Leader of the House of Commons, offered
a different solution than Grey. He proposed separating the duties of War
and Colonies into two positions and advocated giving the newly formed
War Office to Lord Palmerston.^37 The new office of Secretary of State for
War would amalgamate much of the existing administrative structure under
its control.^38 Lord Aberdeen, the Prime Minister, accepted the proposal in
principle but did not push for it; the cabinet was preoccupied with forming
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