THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF HEROISM IN BRITAIN 33
Others were concerned with Panmure’s intellectual capacity. Lord Clarendon
wrote, ‘Panmure is an honest good fellow but by no means of the calibre
for such an office at such a moment and I am sure heisand will be thought
inferior to Newcastle.’^46 Sir George Lewis described Panmure as one of the
dullest men he ever knew.^47 The Duke of Argyll called him as ‘a rough,
strong-headed Scotsman,’ but not ‘a man to resort to in any great crisis of
administration.’^48 Thus it was a challenge for both Panmure and Palmerston,
who had ridden into office on the wave of popular discontent with the
administration of the Army, to make the Army perform more efficiently. If
they did not, the backwash of the wave would sweep them from office as
surely as it had Aberdeen and Newcastle.^49
They lost no time in presenting plans to revamp Army administration. On
10 February Panmure issued a set of proposals to the cabinet for the creation
of two commissions of inquiry to be dispatched to the Crimea (an effort
to blunt the still menacing Roebuck Commission) and for the absorption
of the Secretary at War’s powers into the Secretary for War’s office.^50 This
latter proposal was identical to one Russell had made in December that
Palmerston had refused to support. Six days later Palmerston and Panmure
expanded the new Government’s plan to include the amalgamation of the
civilian components of the Board of Ordnance under the direct control of
the War Office.^51
The reform of the Army’s administration was by this point inevitable.
Such reforms greatly concerned Victoria and Albert, as experience showed
that any change in the system resulted in a loss of Crown authority. Although
Albert had declined Wellington’s suggestion that the Prince Consort become
Commander-in-Chief in 1850, he fully agreed with the Duke’s position on
maintaining existing Crown prerogative.^52 Even before the matter drew to
a head, during the discussions about the severing of War and Colonies,
the Queen had cautioned Aberdeen to make sure the question of Army
reform did not arise in parliament along with it. He assured her that the
changes would be at ministerial level only and the structure of command
would not be altered.^53 Like her husband, Victoria agreed with the Duke of
Wellington’s view of the relationship between the monarch and the military,
that it was ‘of the utmost importance to the stability of the Throne and the
Constitution, that the command of the Army should remain in the hands
of the sovereign, and not fall into those of the House of Commons.’^54 For
Victoria, Crown, constitution, and command were woven inextricably into
a single tapestry.^55
The palace concomitantly maintained a vigil over reform proposals. On
20 January 1855 Secretary at War Sidney Herbert proposed a permanent
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