http://www.bjreview.com FEBRUARY 13, 2020 BEIJING REVIEW 29
WORLD
Comments to [email protected]that they have, in their own words,
got their country back, there are as
many who are grieving and feeling
resentful and angry that they have
lost theirs.
Johnson is a showman and an
instinctive politician. In that sense at
least he resembles Donald Trump.
But he is also a very divisive figure.
Despite his soothing talk about a pe-
riod of healing now needing to begin,
it is unlikely this will be a very easy
thing for someone like him to pre-
side over. This is despite the fact that
moderates who opposed Brexit know
that the bigger picture is at least now
to do their best to either ameliorate
some of the challenges that may
come from this whole endeavor, or
even to try to create opportunities
from them.
But there is a very significant
number who want Brexit to fail, and
feel disenfranchised and, some,
vengeful. One can safely say there-
fore that January 31 is not the end of
the issue. Indeed, it is almost certainly
the beginning of a complex new era.
Challenges ahead
The first landmark in this will be to
attempt to do a trade deal with the
EU by December 31 this year. Till
then, the UK remains part of the
customs union and other business
and economic arrangements cur-
rently in place continue. Negotiation
of this deal will be tough. The UK is
DVLJQLĶFDQWHFRQRP\EXWVPDOOFRPSDUHGWR
the whole of the EU. Politicians like Johnson
have promised great things will be possible and
that Britain will be able to achieve a highly ben-
HĶFLDORXWFRPH7KHPRPHQWRIWUXWKZKHQD
deal in outline is produced later this year will be
a fraught one. This will be when British people
know the kind of future they are going to enjoy
and on what terms they are going to be able to
trade with a partner they are now part of but will
soon be separated from.
A similar process will need to be undertaken
with the U.S. The EU and the U.S. are by far and
away the largest of Britain’s current partners. For
all the warm talk, the simple fact is that neither
agreement will be easy. Both are with formi-
dable adversaries in terms of negotiating skills.
Johnson is not a details man, so this will not be
a strong card for him. The deal he will have to
sign will be one he will have to try to sell to the
SXEOLFEXWWKHßXII\ZRUGVKHKDVSURGXFHGXS
to now will be unlikely to get very far.
It will offer for the first time tangible evi-
dence of what Britain can really achieve in its
post-EU world. It is inevitable some aspirations
and expectations will be broken. It is also very
likely that reality will fall far short of what many
people wanted. The question is by how far.8.&KLQDóUHODWLRQVKLS
Part of Johnson’s vision will be that post-Brexit
Britain will be Global Britain. It will be able to
find a new set of relationships outside of the
main ones it has had through the EU. These will
include places like China, India and emerging
markets in the Asian, African and Latin American
regions. They will also include re-establishing
closer connections with the Commonwealth
group of countries. While such a vision is laud-
ably ambitious, there have to be questions
about how much can really be achieved very
quickly.
China is a good example. It is likely to be the
world’s largest economy sometime in the next
decade. In theory, therefore, it should stand as
an absolute priority. Current levels of invest-
ment and trade between Britain and China
are relatively small. There should be space for
plenty of growth and expansion.
The rhetoric of the Johnson government
about Global Britain is one thing, but the realityunderpinning this is very different. A
senior cabinet minister, when asked
at a conference late last year in the
UK what they wanted from China,
gave the unsettling answer “Nothing
in particular.” It is clear that the cur-
rent leading politicians in Britain do
not understand a huge amount about
China. That is fair enough. After all,
they cover a lot of issues, and they
are already burdened by the need to
know about a myriad of other things.
What is less forgivable is their lack
of awareness of what they might want
from China, of thinking about China
playing a greater role in Britain’s eco-
nomic and geopolitical life.
Up till now, the UK’s stance on
China has been a largely pragmatic
one. Huawei, a worldwide leading
5G equipment provider, has been
granted space, at least in principle,
to work here in ways that has proved
next to impossible in the U.S. and
Australia. Chinese student numbers
have skyrocketed in the last two years.
But parliamentary reports, and some
of the material issuing from respected
think tanks in the UK, increasingly
take a strident tone toward a country
meant to be emerging as the UK’s
PRVWVLJQLĶFDQWQHZRSSRUWXQLW\
In theory, Brexit Britain is in a
place where it can remake its rela-
tions with China in a more bespoke,
more ambitious manner. In practice,
at the moment at least everything is
undecided and unclear. This is hardly
surprising in view of the continuing uncertainty
in almost every other area of policy. But at
some point in the coming few months, the UK
will need to have leaders who are willing to stick
their necks out and proactively seek a new kind
of relationship with China—or, at the very least,
say that this is what they want to achieve in the
coming years.
At the moment, there is little sign that such
a leadership, on this issue at least, actually exists.
It might begin to appear as people, no longer
distracted by the simple act of politically exiting
the EU, start to work out the reality of the coun-
try’s new position. Having a deeper thought
about China’s role in this is going to be key. This
is not an issue that can just be left on the shelf.
It is either that there will be a broader, more
ambitious relationship with the world’s largest
emerging economic power, or a stepping away
from it. Simple passivity and indecision will not
do. That, alas, is what has been seen so far. It is
now utterly unsustainable.QA Brexit countdown clock is projected on the wall of 10 Downing Street in
London, Britain, on January 31XIN
HU
A