92 e lusive v ictories
At this point, though, Wilson’s diplomacy was subverted by
members of his own administration. Both Lansing and House had
become actively pro-British. Lansing went so far as to announce to the
press that Wilson’s December 1916 message was not a call for peace
but rather an eff ort to clarify the belligerents’ positions because the
United States was moving closer to war. Although an angry president
made the secretary of state issue a clarifying statement, Lansing was
not forced to resign. Instead he continued to reassure the Allies pri-
vately (and unbeknownst to the president) that America would never
enter the war on the side of Germany. House expressed the same
message to his confi dants in the British government. Th e Allies were
encouraged, then, to state their most extreme peace terms, knowing
these would not push the United States into the German camp.
Lansing and House pursued a diff erent foreign policy from that of
their president.
Th e fruitless quest for a negotiated settlement taught the president
how little leverage he could actually exercise. Th e Allies in particular
depended on the United States for war supplies and food. Any threat to
shut off the fl ow across the Atlantic, though, would also alarm Amer-
ican businesses and farmers prospering from the markets created by the
war. As far as the Central Powers were concerned, the British blockade
had worked so well in choking off shipping from the United States that
an embargo on their part would have little eff ect. Germany would only
take account of a potential foe with signifi cant military capacity. But
although the U.S. Navy represented an important military chip, the
main conflict in Europe had assumed the form of a clash of vast
conscript armies. With an army at his disposal that barely suffi ced to
contain trouble along the Mexican border, Wilson could hardly threaten
to intervene against Germany in a way that really counted. Th e German
government and high command understood that it would take consid-
erable time after an American declaration of war before American man-
power began to matter on the battlefi eld.
Several factors contributed to the failure of the United States to
create an army that might have sustained Wilson’s diplomacy. Not the
least of these was the president’s own conviction that American
infl uence did not rest on the threat of force. He had fi rmly main-
tained since the outbreak of war that the United States did not need