106 e lusive v ictories
people to buy war bonds, the administration exempted the interest
from taxation. People borrowed so they could buy the bonds, money
fl ooded into circulation, and, with only ineff ective price controls in
place, infl ationary pressures multiplied.
Overall, the Wilson administration met the challenge of mobili-
zation—creating a large army and providing it with the vital sinews of
modern warfare—about as well as could be expected. Nothing like it
had ever been attempted before in the United States. When the process
began in spring 1917, it became evident that some of the wrong people
had been placed in positions of authority, and a few were left too long
in these assignments. But the president and his key subordinates such
as Newton Baker were not afraid to make changes. For example, the
latter brought back from France General Peyton March, Pershing’s chief
of artillery, in March 1918 to serve as army chief of staff when it became
evident that greater urgency was needed. Certainly the missteps at the
outset were no worse than those that had plagued the Allies in the fi rst
year of the war (when the British Army nearly ran out of artillery shells
and had to carefully husband the supply, much to the detriment of the
troops in the front line).
In judging the administration’s mobilization record, we need to keep
in mind that the United States planned to wage its victorious campaign
in spring–summer 1919. Had the war proceeded on the anticipated
timetable, the early stumbles in gearing up for war would have been
passed off as inevitable hiccups in the shift from a peacetime economy.
On the other hand, the Wilson administration’s approach to mobili-
zation, which relied heavily on voluntary cooperation, proved to be
very expensive. Th e United States spent more per day than any other
belligerent because the administration purchased cooperation through
high profi ts and rising wages.
Over Th ere
General “Black Jack” Pershing arrived in France expecting to have
ample time to prepare the AEF for the bitter combat he anticipated in
1918–1919. Although one division of American troops had been cobbled
together with some diffi culty and shipped with him, Pershing’s initial
tasks were preparatory. He and his modest staff (only about thirty