w aging w ar to t ransform the w orld 107offi cers) had to identify a sector of the front where the U.S. Army
would eventually fi ght, set up the logistical arrangements to supply this
force, complete the training of units as they arrived, and fi nally plan his
campaign. Already the French had started to build barracks for the
Americans and identifi ed a sector in Lorraine on the southern (or right)
end of the Allied front that they would turn over to the AEF, a choice
Pershing endorsed. Troops from the United States arrived slowly due
to the shipping logjam, with just 175,000 reaching France by the end of
1917, further confi rming the expectation that the AEF would not be
ready to conduct major operations until 1919.
By late 1917, however, the Americans’ neat plans had started to
unravel in the face of setbacks in the Allied war eff ort. Th e Russian
Revolution, which Wilson had praised in his war message to Congress
as a hopeful stirring of democratic aspirations, took a more extreme
turn with the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks. Th ey signaled their
readiness to conclude a separate peace agreement with Germany. Th is
would allow the enemy to concentrate forces on the Western Front for
a massive off ensive in 1918, well before the AEF would be ready to take
the fi eld as an independent force. With a new sense of urgency, the
British off ered to make available more shipping to transport American
soldiers to France immediately. But the off er came with a catch: the
British wanted only American fighting soldiers, not the full com-
plement of support troops that an army needed to conduct its own
operations. On top of this, Allied commanders, especially the British,
used the newly formed civil-military Supreme War Council to renew
their appeals for the “amalgamation” of American troops within the
Allied armies. Conceding that eventually Pershing would lead an
independent army, British and French military and political leaders
urged that as American combat elements arrived they be incorporated
within Allied divisions already at the front.
Pershing would have none of it. Understanding his brief from the
president—the AEF must achieve independent success for political
reasons—the American commander rejected amalgamation. He would
agree to no more than allowing some American units to be positioned
behind the British sector for training purposes. Wilson ratifi ed his
general’s decision but granted him discretion to adopt amalgamation as
an expedient if circumstances demanded it. Although Pershing