108 e lusive v ictories
prevailed (the Allies had no leverage, given their dire need for man-
power), the debate would continue and become more rancorous over
the following six months.
Th e great German off ensives that began in March 1918 routed several
British and French armies, threatened to push the British out of France,
and placed Paris in danger of capture. Both sides realized they had
reached the ultimate crisis of the war. Th e German high command cal-
culated that its forces could overwhelm the Allies before American
numbers tipped the odds irretrievably against Berlin. Using new
assault tactics that emphasized bypassing enemy centers of resistance,
German troops achieved breakthroughs that seemed impossible in the
face of years of trench warfare stalemate, where gains of hundreds of
yards had cost tens of thousands of casualties. For the Allies, defeat
suddenly seemed possible. When the fi rst attack against the British
fi nally ran out of steam, the Germans launched another, then another,
each yielding sizable gains.
Yet the German General Staff under Quartermaster General Erich
von Ludendorff made fatal planning errors, failing to prepare the logis-
tical support needed to consolidate gains so attacks could continue and
neglecting to focus on a single strategic objective. Successive attacks
through June bled white the German assault forces while achieving
smaller and smaller advances. Still, the off ensives provoked deep con-
sternation, even gloom at times, among senior Allied political and mil-
itary leaders. Th ey fi nally agreed to a step they had resisted for almost
four years, appointing a single supreme military commander, French
General Ferdinand Foch. Pershing, who supported the move, pledged
American cooperation, nominally placing the AEF under Foch’s
authority. ^
Once more the Allies beseeched Pershing to release his troops, and
once more he demurred. By spring 1918 several American divisions had
entered the line, but they were in quiet sectors away from the German
attacks. Th e Supreme War Council, including its American military
representative, Major General Tasker Bliss, backed temporary amal-
gamation. But Pershing believed that subordinating American units to
Allied commands would interrupt the training of AEF senior staff and
thereby delay the moment when an independent American force would
enter combat. On this basis, he still rejected amalgamation.