w aging w ar to t ransform the w orld 109Enraged by his obtuseness amid disaster, the British again appealed
over the general’s head to his political masters in Washington. Initially
Secretary of War Baker wanted to overrule his commander on the scene,
but Pershing’s objections led the secretary to reverse himself. Pershing
would contribute to the Allied cause, but strictly on his terms: in
exchange for the temporary use of American troops, he secured a
promise that excess shipping could be used to transport specialists he
needed to fi ll out AEF higher formations (divisions and larger) plus a
fi rm commitment that an independent AEF would become operational
on a sector of the front by a specifi ed date, with all American units
returning to his command. French Premier Clemenceau, who judged
Pershing to be a mediocre offi cer, could not understand why Wilson
had delegated so much authority to his fi eld commander. Pershing’s
insistence on an American sector, however, was fully in keeping with
the president’s defi nition of American national objectives.
Under the terms that Pershing extracted, American troops began to
enter combat in late May 1918, with signifi cant numbers engaged by
July. Most fought in American divisional formations, some still suf-
fering from lingering shortages in certain categories such as field
artillery that had to be made up by the Allies. American units held rel-
atively quiet positions, freeing up more experienced British and French
troops to meet the later German attacks. Ludendorff realized by July
that the arrival of American soldiers in signifi cant numbers had turned
the tide: they could be used to release enough veteran British or French
units to hold any German attack. In turn Foch promptly assumed the
off ensive. Th e Allied attacks included signifi cant American contribu-
tions—some 270,000 American troops in two corps fought under
French command in the July off ensive on the Aisne Marne. At this
point Foch did not expect a breakthrough but instead sought to infl ict
“irreversible attrition” on the Germans. On August 10, 1918, Pershing
fi nally secured his long-sought goal, the activation of the First United
States Army under his command near Saint-Mihiel.
Th e fi rst major American off ensives, especially in the Meuse-Argonne
sector, made clear how much the inexperienced AEF yet needed to
learn about twentieth-century trench warfare. American soldiers would
pay dearly for their commanders’ lessons. Pershing’s determination to
instill an off ensive spirit in his troops resulted in devastating losses