w aging w ar to t ransform the w orld 113in shaping a postwar settlement rested with Wilson and the Entente
leaders. As for the latter, they appeared to have endorsed Wilson’s core
principles, as embodied in his Fourteen Points, albeit with reservations
that might yet prove disruptive. Th e AEF had provided the margin of
victory. The Allies knew it, too: when they balked at accepting the
Fourteen Points, House hinted the Americans might withdraw their
army, and that suffi ced to bring them into line behind the president. ^
Making America Safe for Democracy
All wartime presidents dislike criticism of their policies and leadership,
but none was more defensive than Woodrow Wilson. Presidents have a
natural tendency when the country is at war to view themselves as the
embodiments of the national interest. From that perspective, it is but a
short step to the position that criticism of the administration expresses
disloyalty and dissent reflects treason. Wilson crossed that small
distance when the United States entered the war. In other nations,
political leaders reached across party lines to form governments of
national unity; Lincoln had bent over backward to woo Democrats to
support his war. Wilson would have none of that. He rebuff ed Repub-
lican calls to broaden his administration and turned the 1918 election
into a partisan referendum on his war policy. As for domestic oppo-
sition to the war, his administration pursued the most repressive
approach of any wartime president in American history.
Th e Wilson administration understood the importance of sustaining
popular support for the war eff ort. Some of its measures refl ected a
shrewd appreciation of the challenges a government faces when it asks
for broad sacrifi ces from its citizens. Conscription stands as an excellent
illustration. American experience (the Civil War, to be specific)
suggested that a draft would be very unpopular and might provoke
active resistance. Although the preparedness movement, with its cele-
bration of universal service, had laid the groundwork for conscription,
popular acceptance was no certainty in 1917. Especially in the South,
where the tradition of the citizen-soldier as willing volunteer remained
the ideal, many preferred to see the government fi rst try to fi ll the ranks
of the planned army through conventional recruitment eff orts. To help
neutralize potential opposition, the administration decided to entrust