Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

(Axel Boer) #1

4 e lusive v ictories


Th ings improved little once the army reached land. Senior offi cers,
with no experience commanding large military formations, misjudged
the difficulties of moving through swamps; men sweated in heavy
fl annel and wool uniforms designed for fi ghting Indians on the Western
plains; and some soldiers carried old rifl es that fi red black-powder car-
tridges, the telltale smoke revealing their positions to the enemy. 
Despite the diffi culties, the army managed to defeat the smaller Spanish
forces at El Caney and San Juan Hill in costly attacks on July 1, 1898,
and placed Santiago under siege.
At that point, nature intervened: the Americans were decimated by
yellow fever and malaria. Th e medical services, unprepared for tropical
conditions, were overwhelmed. Ships laden with supplies could not
offload at the primitive docking facilities at Daiquiri and nearby
Siboney, and men in the trenches went hungry. So desperate were the
conditions that the American commanders asked Washington to accept
terms that would allow the trapped Spanish troops to march unhin-
dered to Havana rather than surrender. 
Now to another invasion by American military forces, this one in
early 2003 and marked by the rapid but meticulously organized
deployment of more than 150,000 troops to the other side of the world. 
Th e assault on Iraq was conducted soon after another major military
operation in Afghanistan, with substantial forces still committed there. 
For the Iraq campaign, American defense staff ers had devised a clear
plan for the advance on Baghdad, one that incorporated several opera-
tional alternatives (one or two lines of attack, depending on political
circumstances).  Th e American force assembled was the best-equipped
military in world, highly trained and experienced. It enjoyed a vast
technological edge over its Iraqi adversaries. So superior was the Amer-
ican advantage that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld scaled back
the initial deployment plans.
Despite the striking differences between the two invasions, one
important similarity bears noting: in both instances, the president of
the United States had established the broad political goals that military
intervention was designed to secure. William McKinley had been reluc-
tant to go to war with Spain over Cuba, where violent unrest had
plagued the island for years. Once he decided that war could no longer
be avoided, however, he resolved to liberate Cuba from Spanish control.

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