w aging w ar to t ransform the w orld 121But the president’s position began to erode as soon as the armistice
went into effect. He thought that with the Allies so dependent on
American loans and American troops, they would not dare refuse
American demands. The tough armistice terms that the Allies had
required, however, stripped Germany of the capacity to resume fi ghting.
Thus American military power largely ceased to matter. Moreover,
although the Allies owed vast sums to the United States, debt was a
weapon that cut both ways. Unless France collected signifi cant repara-
tions from its defeated foes, it would be in no position to repay its
American creditors. Wilson further weakened himself with self-infl icted
political wounds. As many historians have commented, he erred by
excluding Republicans from the American delegation to the conference.
Partisanship had availed him little in the 1918 congressional elections,
which as I noted cost the Democrats control of both houses of Congress.
Now, despite the obvious need for opposition support for any peace
treaty, Wilson let his personal distaste for Republican Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge override the compelling argument for a bipartisan
delegation.
Rather than recount the negotiating process that took up most of the
fi rst half of 1919, I focus here on Wilson’s core goals, his successes and
failures, and the elements that thwarted him from achieving a number
of his key objectives.
His goals were ambitious, to say the least. First and foremost, the
president insisted that the peace treaty include, among its opening pro-
visions, a League of Nations that would address international tensions
and protect small nations against aggression. Confi dent that various
forms of arbitration or mediation would resolve most disputes, he
understood that the organization still would need recourse to sanctions,
including the possible use of force, to be effective. Second, he
expressed support for political self-determination, especially for people
who had been subjects in multinational, multiethnic empires. Th e prin-
ciple of self-determination also extended to colonized peoples, though
Wilson considered them not yet ready for full self-rule and preferred
mandate arrangements under League auspices as an interim measure of
indefi nite duration. Th ird, Wilson believed in what might be termed
quick German redemption. Assigning much of the blame for the war to
the Kaiser and his military, the president hoped for relatively mild peace