124 e lusive v ictories
migrations had produced. Within every proposed national territory
could be found regions in which minorities formed majorities and now
demanded their right to self-determination, and within these smaller
regions were still other minorities asserting their own rights. Simply
put, once self-determination became the defi ning principle for drawing
boundaries, the process pointed ultimately toward anarchy.
Th at outcome, of course, was unacceptable to the conferees in Paris,
so they tried to impose limits. Here the Allies encountered another
problem: their writ did not extend very far on the ground, especially as
the rapid demobilization of Allied troops (and the declining willingness
of the rest to risk their lives) meant that actual borders would be settled
by the most powerful local forces. Th us the eastern border of Poland
would be determined through combat between the new Polish Army
and Russian Bolshevik formations, with Ukrainian separatists adding to
the confusion.
Harsher terms for Germany reflected a combination of French
intransigence and Anglo-American moralizing. Clemenceau had a very
diff erent view of how to assure French security than did Wilson. Th e
French premier placed little faith in the League; he subscribed instead
to traditional notions of alliances and a balance of power, expecting
Germany to revive and again become a threat too great for France alone
to contain. Accordingly, he sought a defense treaty with Great Britain
and the United States, control over parts of western Germany, tight
restrictions on German military power, and other punitive terms at
odds with Wilson’s intention to normalize German status. France also
faced enormous war debts and rebuilding expenses, which it hoped to
cover through German reparations. In this vein, note that although
Wilson asked for no direct German reparations to his own country, he
expected the French to repay what they owed the United States and
thereby increased Clemenceau’s determination to pass on the burden to
his vanquished foe across the Rhine. Wilson himself was of two minds
about Germany. He wanted it to rejoin the international community in
good standing, yes, but he, like British prime minister David Lloyd
George, believed the Germans should be chastised for their aggression.
In this regard, they shared common ground with the French.
Finally, beyond Wilson’s difficulties with the other conferees, he
miscalculated the role of public opinion on the peace conference. When