128 e lusive v ictories
opposition and sought to propose amendments or reservations to the
treaty to induce enough senators to vote against it. Wilson tried fi rst to
persuade senators not yet publicly committed. However, because he
would accept only explanatory reservations (which would not require
actual changes in treaty wording and thus might have no legal force),
he could not convince enough of the moderate foes to vote yes. By
September it became evident that Lodge could either force major
changes or defeat the treaty outright. Wilson, despite clear signs of
failing health, decided on a speaking tour across the country, convinced
he could mobilize public opinion to pressure the Senate to endorse the
treaty as it stood. He collapsed after a speech in Colorado on September
25, 1919, returned to Washington, and suff ered a major stroke that left
him largely incapacitated for several months.
Lodge capitalized on Wilson’s refusal to compromise by striking a
deal with the mild reservationists: the anti-Wilson coalition would
support approval with fourteen reservations, the most important of
which declared that the United States would not support League sanc-
tions against an aggressor (Article X) unless Congress approved. In
November, Lodge and his allies defeated the treaty in its original form,
while Wilson directed his Senate backers to reject it with the reserva-
tions attached. With the president still refusing to compromise, the
Senate again voted down the treaty in March 1920, eff ectively ending
any chance that the nation would join the League.
Wilson plainly missed opportunities for compromise that would
have led to approval of the Treaty of Versailles with reservations and to
American membership in the new League of Nations. By some esti-
mates, as many as four out of fi ve senators were prepared to back the
Treaty in some form. Lodge did not reject outright the idea of Amer-
ican participation, though he preferred more traditional alliances
grounded in the threat of force. (Note the similarity between his
position and Clemenceau’s.) To be sure, reservations would have com-
plicated American diplomacy, forcing additional negotiations with the
Allies. But treaty approval in any form would have established the
foundation for ongoing American engagement in the international
organization Wilson saw as the cornerstone of a new framework of
international relations. Th e president miscalculated his prospects for
forcing the Senate to bend to his will, overestimating his ability to move