f reedom of a ction 135years, American mobilization produced both an unequaled military
force for waging global war and suffi cient additional output to meet a
significant part of the needs of the nation’s allies. Massive military
spending also revived American prosperity, but the president still paid
a political price as mobilization and war-generated social tensions
empowered his conservative opponents. American strategy on the bat-
tlefi eld refl ected both immediate military considerations and the presi-
dent’s larger political purposes. Much like Lincoln, Roosevelt played an
active part in shaping military decisions during the early part of the
war, intervening less often as it became clear that the Allies were heading
toward victory over both Germany and Japan. Roosevelt also showed
himself to be the most astute strategic thinker among the leaders of the
major belligerent nations. At home, the president preserved broad
popular support for the war, thanks to an approach that limited battle-
fi eld casualties and because of his attention to the timing of military
operations.
For all this, Roosevelt could not escape the loss of agency. Decisions
had to be made; important campaigns took on a life of their own; and
other Allied powers had their own agendas. Time ran out for Roosevelt,
just as it had with his predecessors.
Stumbling into Infamy
Although hindsight makes World War II appear inevitable, it did not
seem so to most contemporary eyes even in the late 1930s. Th e rise of
Hitler in Germany in 1933 increased tensions in Europe, but many
thought his ambitions might be curbed through alliances and
diplomacy. Munich in September 1938 represented the culmination of
the diplomatic approach: British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain
ceded the Sudetanland portion of Czechoslovakia to Hitler and in so
doing believed he had assured “peace for our time.” Even a civil war that
erupted in Spain in 1936 and attracted external support from both
fascists and communists did not spread beyond the Pyrenees and fi nally
ended with the rout of the Republicans in 1939.
On the other side of the globe, Japan had occupied Manchuria in
1931, which whetted the appetite of Tokyo’s militarists for greater
conquests. Japanese army units staged an incident in Beijing in July