Elusive Victories_ The American Presidency at War-Oxford University Press (2012)

(Axel Boer) #1

6 e lusive v ictories


objectives, prepare for the peace that will follow the fi ghting, engage in
diplomacy to secure and retain allies and undercut support for adver-
saries, and sustain political support at home. The list is daunting.
Because every task demands its own time, moreover, the president also
must wrestle with their relative importance. None can be ignored, lest
he fail to achieve the goals he has established in taking the nation to war
in the fi rst place.
As I will show, presidents have struggled to manage their wartime
leadership challenges, especially preparing for peace and the postwar
order. Moreover, their performance appears to be worsening over time.
Despite the enormous military resources at their disposal, modern
American presidents have often failed in their military ventures. Results
from recent wars range from prolonged stalemates (Vietnam in the
1960s and 1970s) to incomplete victory (the Persian Gulf in 1991) to
initial triumph giving way to protracted violence (Iraq and Afghani-
stan). Th e repeated failures in wartime presidential leadership beg for
explanation.


Debates and Puzzles


Writing on wartime leadership is as old as the study of history itself.
Texts by Th ucydides and Sun Tzu, and later volumes by Niccolo Machi-
avelli and Carl von Clausewitz mix analysis and prescription. In the
fi fth century b.c. Th ucydides chronicled the Peloponnesian Wars in
part to instruct subsequent generations of statesmen in how to avoid
the errors made by his contemporaries.  When Th ucydides writes, “It
is a common mistake in going to war to begin at the wrong end, to act
fi rst, and wait for disaster to discuss the matter,”  his warning carries
across the centuries to American policy makers who dismissed the pros-
pects of sectarian strife in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq invasion. In
the wake of the Napoleonic Wars, Clausewitz developed a theory of war
that famously treats it as an extension of policy or statecraft “by other
means.”  His implication is clear: a leader must never lose sight of his
political objectives.
Debate over American presidential wartime leadership heightens
when the wars themselves or the actions of presidents during them
become controversial. The assertion of extraordinary executive

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