f reedom of a ction 141Within the ranks of the administration itself lay a third impediment
to the president’s freedom of action. Th e federal government expanded
dramatically during the New Deal, with new agencies springing up
constantly and old ones adopting new responsibilities. To direct this
enlarged administrative apparatus, Roosevelt had added White House
staff , often borrowing personnel from other departments. Still, he exer-
cised only loose control over his subordinates and the federal bureau-
cracy. He also preferred a management style aptly described as
competitive: his aides vied for his attention and favor, but none enjoyed
his full confi dence. It was not uncommon for a senior offi cial to leave a
meeting with FDR believing the president had been persuaded to take
action, only to learn later that he had backed away from a decision. For
Roosevelt, this seemed to preserve the latitude he so prized. However,
in the void left by presidential inaction and non-decisions, factions
within the administration often chose to pursue the course they believed
the president ought to have taken. “Rather than a smoothly func-
tioning, harmonious machine,” observes historian Jonathan G. Utley,
“the foreign policy establishment in the Roosevelt administration was a
snake pit of influential leaders and faceless bureaucrats working at
cross-purposes, striking deals, and not infrequently employing sleight
of hand in order to move the nation in the direction each thought most
appropriate.”
Th e multiple agendas below the president tugged American policy in
directions Roosevelt was not yet prepared to go and set diff erent pol-
icies at cross-purposes. Japanese aggression, fi rst against China and later
aimed at points farther south, exposed the deep rifts within the State
Department and elsewhere in the federal bureaucracy. On one side were
hard-liners determined to punish Japan and force it to quit China
entirely; on the other stood cooler heads, such as Secretary Hull, who
realized that European colonial powers in Asia lacked the military
means to face down Japan and Germany at the same time.
The bureaucratic factions clashed repeatedly and pursued their
respective notion of proper American policy in a no-holds-barred
contest of wills. In 1940 the president decided to prevent Japan from
purchasing aviation gasoline needed by the U.S. armed forces, so he
ordered it placed under an embargo. Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, a
strong proponent of using economic coercion to infl uence Japanese