f reedom of a ction 149For the most part, though, events framed and limited Roosevelt’s
options, narrowing his freedom of action even before the United States
became a belligerent. So far as he did establish a clear grand strategy,
moreover, he did not follow through ruthlessly on its logic. “Germany
First” implied greater eff orts to placate Japan, by assuring it of access to
resources and curtailing aid for China. Instead, heavy-handed economic
pressure magnifi ed Tokyo’s sense of vulnerability, while the feverish
American military buildup led Japan to attack before the odds tilted
against it. Had Hitler not played into the president’s hands by declaring
war on the United States in December 1941, the entire Anglo-American
grand strategy might have unraveled.
OHIO
When Germany struck Poland on September 1, 1939, the United States
Army ranked as the seventeenth largest in the world, sandwiched
between Portugal and Bulgaria. With 174,000 offi cers and men, the
Army stood well below its authorized strength of 250,000. Only a
nation confi dent it faced no signifi cant threat would maintain such an
insignifi cant military establishment. Th e puny size of the army testifi ed
to the failure of the Wilsonian attempt to have the United States accept
broad responsibilities for preserving peace. By comparison, as we’ve
seen, the U.S. Navy was a force that might give a potential adversary
pause. Yet rather than capitalize on American industrial might after
World War I by building the world’s largest fleet, American policy
makers chose to negotiate naval arms limitation treaties (beginning
with the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty) that restricted the number and
size of American vessels. Th e American fl eet still matched the Royal
Navy as the world’s largest, but unlike Japan, which could concentrate
in the Far East, the United States faced hostile powers on two oceans.
Moreover, by the mid-1930s Japan and Germany each renounced treaty
restrictions and started major naval rearmament programs before the
United States, so they enjoyed a head start.
When a president recognizes American vulnerability, as Roosevelt
did by late 1938, or concludes war is likely, as he did by early 1941, his
next task is to prepare for war. Th is task has military, socioeconomic,
and political dimensions. He must make certain the armed forces under