156 e lusive v ictories
down his arms unconditionally would prompt him to resist more
fi ercely. Th e result might be heavier Allied casualties than would be
incurred with the off er of more lenient terms.
But the arguments against the unconditional surrender policy do not
stand up under inspection. In the case of the Pacifi c theater, Japanese
soldiers had already demonstrated that they would almost never sur-
render, no matter how hopeless their military position. Th ey had been
thoroughly indoctrinated in the view that capitulation was worse than
death. Th eir conduct on the battlefi eld did not change in the aftermath
of the Casablanca announcement. Nor did that of the Germans.
Notably, the most serious attempt on Hitler’s life, the July 1944 bomb
plot, occurred when the offi cers involved knew full well of the Allied
demand. It did not stop a number of the most senior German offi cers,
including two fi eld marshals (Erwin Rommel and Günther von Kluge),
from giving at least tacit endorsement to the eff ort to kill the führer and
overthrow the regime. Th e plotters expected a temporary military gov-
ernment to open surrender negotiations with the Allies immediately.
Further, large numbers of German troops, even entire armies (as in
Tunisia in May 1943), capitulated when they recognized their positions
to be hopeless. If anything encouraged fanatical German resistance to
the end of the war, it likely was the fear of Soviet revenge for German
atrocities and the order by Heinrich Himmler in 1944 that the families
of deserters would be executed.
The policy decision to pursue unconditional surrender brought
clarity to the Allied cause, perhaps a mixed blessing. On one side, both
those on the front lines and those at home could have no doubts about
whether their leaders intended to carry the fi ght to fi nal victory. Th e
dirty business of war would be pressed to the end. On the other, in
making the commitment to the total defeat of the regimes in Berlin and
Tokyo, Roosevelt did something he had always taken pains to avoid—
he constrained his own discretion. Unless the military situation became
deadlocked, the goal could not be revised downward. Much like
Lincoln after emancipation, Roosevelt left no room for peace overtures
to either government.
For the president, the commitment to the total defeat of Germany
and Japan represented only the proximate Allied war goal, the essential
fi rst step. After a second cataclysmic war in a generation, Roosevelt was