f reedom of a ction 157determined to succeed where Wilson had failed and create a stable,
peaceful international order. Here Roosevelt avoided defi nitive state-
ments and fi rm commitments. He moved cautiously toward his objec-
tives, retreating or hedging his bets at times. Still, a vision of the
postwar world that Roosevelt sought emerges from his diplomacy, com-
ments to the press, speeches, and actions. He looked forward to a
system of collective security in which four great powers—the United
States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China—would assure
peace and resolve disputes, within the framework of an inclusive inter-
national organization (which in 1945 took the specific form of the
United Nations). Th is arrangement would replace the older system of
spheres of infl uence that the president believed to be a source of inter-
national friction.
Roosevelt was also convinced that colonialism must end, for it, too,
represented a source of competition among major nations, while colo-
nial peoples would not accept permanent subordinate status. They
might not be ready for self-government—Roosevelt refl ected the casual
racial prejudices of Western elites that non-white peoples would need
a period of careful supervision before they could fully manage their
societies—but they could be set on a path toward independence. (Th e
same off -hand racism led the president to bow to pressure in early 1942
to intern Japanese Americans.) To avoid the stifl ing economic eff ects
of exclusive trading blocs, moreover, the postwar order would rest upon
a liberalized set of economic arrangements, with few obstacles to free
trade.
Several elements in this Roosevelt vision deserve scrutiny. To begin
with, although the president and his advisors saw the arrangements he
favored as universally benefi cial, they were plainly American-centric.
Th e four great powers included a Great Britain that would be deeply in
debt to the United States and hobbled by its crippling wartime expen-
ditures. Th us the British lion could be expected to dance to Washing-
ton’s tune. Likewise, China would be recovering from a long war,
protracted Japanese occupation of key cities, and internal political
turmoil. Th e United States would need to guide China as it gradually
assumed a leading role in Asia. In economic terms, free trade would
play to the strengths of the United States as the dominant industrial
power and the only one not directly ravaged by the war. That the