f reedom of a ction 161Th rough the massive program of war production, Roosevelt took the
fi rst step toward rapprochement with his erstwhile antagonists in corpo-
rate America. Th e War Production Board (WPB), directed by Donald
M. Nelson, a former retail business executive, sought to steer economic
mobilization through a system of committees. Much as the Wilson
administration had drawn upon the expertise of corporate leaders in the
First World War, the WPB tapped businessmen to staff its functional
divisions and industrial advisory boards. Business leaders also were
invited to comment on all plans, and large fi rms did especially well
because Nelson, other WPB offi cials, and the military believed only
major corporations could fi ll big orders quickly.
As a further sweetener, procurement contracts were on a cost-plus
basis that provided, in the words of historian David M. Kennedy, “iron-
clad guarantees of profits beyond the most avaricious monopolist’s
dreams.” Th ese inducements to business helped to address one of
the president’s long-standing political problems—the alienation of
American capital from his administration. Alas, the committees and
contracts did little to clear up production logjams stemming from a
decentralized procurement process under which the military services
placed their own orders and made demands for scarce resources. Various
administrative expedients were tried in 1942–1943 that eventually led to
a more effi cient allocation of resources.
Political and military leaders also quarreled about what to build. For
instance, in the fi rst months after the United States entered the war, the
president and his advisors debated whether it made more sense to meet
the U-boat threat by building anti-submarine warfare ships or more
merchant vessels. Sometimes, too, the allure of glamour weapons like
battleships eclipsed the appeal of the humble equipment that meant at
least as much to the war eff ort. Allied operations were compromised
until well into 1944 by the lack of landing craft with which to move
troops onto enemy beaches. (To appreciate how important these little
vessels were, note that every signifi cant American campaign of the war
began with an amphibious operation.) Eventually American factories
turned out more than 40,000 landing craft of all types, but that
impressive total masks the inattention to the need that characterized
early war mobilization and the resultant shortages that forced Allied
planners to choose between or delay operations.