f reedom of a ction 195of the Red Army advancing at least to the Rhine and quite possibly to
the Channel coast. Postwar geopolitics would have looked very dif-
ferent, and not to the advantage of the West.
Comparisons between Roosevelt and Churchill tend to exaggerate the
diff erences in their approach to wartime leadership. Roosevelt prudently
relied upon the massive military organization the United States created
to wage a global war and intervened selectively. He gave, as we’ve seen,
strong support to the B-29 bomber program, which at $3 billion repre-
sented an extraordinary investment in a weapons system for the time and
so needed extra political muscle behind it. On certain matters of mil-
itary technology, such as carrier aviation, he learned a great deal and
asked sharp questions, just as the prime minister did. But the president
was also the kind of hands-on leader who often preferred not to leave his
fi ngerprints on a decision. Recall his insistence that no minutes or
notes be taken in most of his meetings with senior advisors. Such an
arrangement suited a man who might want to hold open his options or
change his mind. Roosevelt’s informal organizational structure funneled
power to him and let him make the fi nal decisions on many matters,
even if his role was not visible. He rarely overrode his military chiefs
because they understood his political objectives and strategic priorities.
Wartime presidents inevitably lose their capacity to alter direction
over the course of a war. Roosevelt did everything he could to preserve
his freedom of action. He placed himself at the center of the decision-
making apparatus and kept his subordinates focused on his broad objec-
tives. He put off choices and binding commitments as long as possible,
weighed carefully different means to achieve his goals, adjusted his
tactics to changing circumstances. Yet in the end, his path was tightly
circumscribed—he could not halt the unnecessary ongoing campaign in
the Philippines or the strategic bombing that pounded ruined German
cities, prevent the imposition of Stalinist government across Eastern
Europe, or halt the restoration of colonial regimes in Asia.
Th e Good War
As Roosevelt faced the prospect of war, he hoped to have a unifi ed
public behind him. Pearl Harbor gave him what he wanted. No orga-
nized effort was needed to suppress dissent of the sort the Wilson