198 e lusive v ictories
Th e post-TORCH operations in the Mediterranean into mid-1944,
moreover, followed a political as well as military rationale. They
refl ected Roosevelt’s judgment that the American people would not tol-
erate a long period of inactivity in the European theater while the press
pointed out the insufficiency of resources devoted to beating the
Japanese and some on the political left called for a Second Front (now!)
to help the gallant Red Army. Against these political considerations,
Roosevelt had to weigh the lives of the troops sent into battles that
might not be justifi ed in strictly military terms. But for a wartime dem-
ocratic leader, no decision can ever be purely military—if the people
cease to believe in the confl ict, it is lost.
Time Runs Out
Like Lincoln, Roosevelt died before the end of the war through which
he had led his fellow citizens. And, like Lincoln, Roosevelt’s passing has
prompted much speculation about how the future would have diff ered
had he survived. But by the time of his death each president had lost
most of his capacity to shape the world after the war. Th eir successors
inherited situations over which no president could have exercised sig-
nificant control. Roosevelt had believed he could influence Stalin’s
behavior by drawing him into a fabric of postwar international institu-
tions and economic arrangements. Truman quickly adopted a more
confrontational style to what he regarded as Soviet violations of com-
mitments. Th ose commitments, of course, had never been anything
more than window-dressing, designed for consumption by Roosevelt’s
and Churchill’s domestic constituencies, and both men knew it. Stalin
did not respond positively to Truman’s abrasive tone, but there is no
reason to think the Soviet leader would have given in any more readily
to Roosevelt. Stalin had his own postwar agenda, and it came to the
fore when the glue of a common enemy dissolved. Poised with their
own plans, too, were key domestic actors: the conservative members of
Congress and business leaders eager to get back to civilian production
and to curb union militancy. No president would determine the
postwar agenda for American politics.
In one important respect, Lincoln was more successful than Roos-
evelt as a wartime leader. Lincoln demonstrated a deeper trust in the