12 e lusive v ictories
domestic insurrections, and to impose standards upon the state militia.
Th e article prohibits the use of any army appropriation for longer than
two years, a legacy of colonial mistrust of standing armies. In giving
Congress the power to declare war, the Framers recognized that such a
step should be taken only after careful consideration. Th is refl ects the
broader spirit of a constitutional design that views debate and deliber-
ation as off ering the best path to the common good of the nation.
Th e Constitution’s spare language leaves unresolved much about the
allocation of authority over national security. For example, Article IV
states, “Th e United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a
republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against
invasion.” Although the wording commits the national government to
act, it does not specify which branch is responsible. Th e president as
commander in chief may order an immediate military response, but
only Congress may call state forces into national service. Nor does the
Constitution define “invasion.” Could the term be construed to
include not just a massive attack across the borders of the United States
but also more modest incursions or raids, possibly by irregular forces
operating without the approval of any government? Perhaps most
important, the Framers understood the difference between armed
confl ict and a formal state of war. Th ey purposefully decided to grant
Congress the power to declare war, not the power to make war. But it
is not clear what they intended to accomplish by establishing that
distinction.
Constitutional ambiguity has fueled the recurrent debate about the
scope of presidential war-making authority. On one side are those who
contend that the Framers invested the president with broad authority
to preserve the national security. In choosing to limit Congress to the
power to declare war, they recognized that protecting the nation might
require what Alexander Hamilton referred to as “energy,” the capacity
for urgent action that is not the strong suit of a deliberative legislature.
Th ey also appreciated that situations might arise in which the use of
force would be appropriate without recourse to a formal declaration of
war. From what I would call the presidentialist viewpoint, Congress can
restrain such operations only by resorting to its explicit power to
withhold funds from the armed forces, thereby compelling the president
to bring the troops home.