s taying the c ourse 205communists were confi dent that as the only legitimate anticolonial
independence movement they would easily triumph. (American intel-
ligence estimates suggested that Ho might win 80 percent of the vote in
a free election.) Many communist troops in the southern part of
Vietnam, following orders from the party leadership, regrouped to the
DRV in anticipation of a quick return, while party political cadres
remained behind to organize for the election. ^
Th e expected vote to reunite Vietnam, however, never occurred.
President Dwight Eisenhower decided not to recognize the Geneva
accords or treat them as binding on the United States. Instead he
backed the newly formed government of South Vietnam (GVN),
under its leader Ngo Dinh Diem, as a noncommunist state. Stepping
gingerly around the Geneva terms (which barred either of the tem-
porary governments from entering a military alliance), the Eisenhower
administration formed a regional security pact, the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization (SEATO), and placed South Vietnam under its
protection. On this basis, the United States supplanted France as the
principal benefactor of Diem’s regime, training his army from 1956
onward and providing it with weapons and equipment. D i e m
declined to hold the reunifi cation election stipulated by the peace
agreement and set out to consolidate his political grip. Over the next
several years, his army and police rounded up political opponents and
began to destroy the stay-behind communist political apparatus. Th e
communists reciprocated by engaging in a campaign of violence
against the government, especially assassination of local offi cials, while
communist troops sent north began to return to South Vietnam to
conduct larger military operations. Hanoi also established the
National Liberation Front (NLF) in December 1960 to give local
direction to the rebellion in the South. By the time John F. Kennedy
entered the White House in January 1961, the Diem government faced
a mounting insurgency.
Where Eisenhower had enjoyed a free hand after Geneva, Kennedy
did not have the same luxury. In his presidential campaign, he called
for a restoration of American fi rmness; he followed in his inaugural
address by affi rming his determination to oppose communist expansion
at any point, calling explicitly for Americans to be prepared to make
sacrifi ces in the name of freedom. Th is stance did not accommodate