206 e lusive v ictories
sober refl ection on whether specifi c communist challenges endangered
American security or that of its key allies. Accordingly, as the commu-
nists in South Vietnam, referred to as the Vietcong or VC (for Viet-
namese Communists), upped their pressure on Diem’s regime, the
Kennedy administration reacted. Th e president and his key advisors,
notably Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, did not lack for
confi dence that they knew how best to meet the threat. Th e adminis-
tration included proponents of counterinsurgency warfare, a politico-
military approach designed to bolster popular support for an
established government—winning hearts and minds, as it was called—
while denying guerilla forces the grassroots backing they needed to
sustain a protracted campaign of subversion. Kennedy increased the
number of American advisors in South Vietnam as well as the level of
military assistance to the Diem government. In early 1962, the fi rst
U.S. Special Forces (the Green Berets) arrived to help train and advise
the regime’s forces.
Yet reports from the field suggested that the growing American
involvement was not stemming the erosion of the South Vietnamese
government’s position. In combat with the Vietcong, troops of Diem’s
Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) usually came off worst,
displaying a reluctance to fi ght despite American coaching and superior
equipment. Given that Diem picked commanders for their political
loyalty rather than their military competence, the poor ARVN perfor-
mance was predictable. Th e Americans could do little to alter the sit-
uation, though, because Diem demonstrated a strong streak of
independence and rejected their efforts to influence his choices of
senior officers. He also ignored pleas from American diplomats to
broaden the base of his regime. By mid-1963, political opposition to
Diem, especially from Buddhist monks, erupted in street demonstra-
tions that included spectacular acts of self-immolation captured on
camera and published in American newspapers.
Kennedy began to doubt whether South Vietnam could be held and
contemplated drawing down the American commitment. But facing
what seemed like a diffi cult reelection bid in 1964, he also appreciated
his need to forestall anything that looked like a communist victory.
Meanwhile, South Vietnamese military leaders initiated plans to over-
throw Diem, and their scheme received at least implicit blessing from