s taying the c ourse 207some U.S. offi cials. A coup on November 1, 1963, toppled the regime
and resulted in the murder of both Diem and his brother.
Kennedy’s assassination just days later placed Lyndon Johnson at the
helm of U.S. policy in Vietnam. Coping with the worsening situation
in South Vietnam became one of Johnson’s fi rst priorities. Th e coup
against Diem brought to power General Duong Van “Big” Minh, who
disappointed American hopes by voicing interest in a political set-
tlement that might include the communists in a power-sharing
arrangement. To Washington’s relief, another military revolt in January
1964 displaced Minh with the more staunchly anticommunist General
Nguyen Khanh. Political stability in South Vietnam proved elusive,
one junta quickly following another, sometimes with intervals of gov-
ernment by civilian fi gureheads. Making matters worse, communist
gains on the battlefield continued, aided by increasing infiltration
through Laos on what was known as the Ho Chi Minh Trail. Th at route
brought supplies to support the Viet Cong and may have also seen the
passage of the first regular units of the North Vietnamese Army
(NVA).
In the Americans’ view, the war had entered a new and more dan-
gerous phase marked by what they regarded as overt North Vietnamese
aggression. (Th e Vietnamese communists always rejected such claims
on the grounds that, as the Geneva accords acknowledged, Vietnam
remained a single country, and troops from the North merely fought to
restore national unity.) Senior Americans, including the incoming head
of the U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV), General
William Westmoreland, warned in early 1964 that the enemy might
achieve decisive victory on the battlefi eld. Th e new American president,
then, would not be given the luxury of addressing Vietnam on his own
timetable.
Meeting the Test
Even as Vietnam demanded Johnson’s immediate attention, the confl ict
left the president with very limited options. He took it as a given that
the United States must resist communist-inspired aggression wherever
it arose. At the same time, though, the danger of nuclear confrontation
with major communist powers and the possibility that China might