216 e lusive v ictories
Johnson did exercise full control, by contrast, over the politics of
going to war in Vietnam—whether to seek a declaration of war or
explicit congressional approval for a major commitment of American
forces. Although the Tonkin Gulf Resolution’s broad wording met the
formal test of legislative approval, to rest escalation entirely on that
foundation represented a gamble. Harry Truman had based his
authority to intervene in Korea on the United Nations Charter, even
though congressional leaders unanimously endorsed his decision and he
easily could have secured legislative support in June 1950. When the war
stalled and popular disillusionment followed, he could not fall back on
the approval of Congress.
Johnson had seen this and understood the risks: a president becomes
politically vulnerable if a war becomes unpopular. A close student of
Roosevelt, he had also learned that sacrifi ce abroad requires consensus
at home. Yet he chose not to seek additional congressional authori-
zation when he resolved to Americanize the war because he rejected the
derailing of his domestic agenda. On the same basis he decided not to
support intervention by calling up the military reserves, contrary to a
JCS recommendation. To activate reserve forces for more than a year
required an act of Congress, and the price might be suspension or
reduction of domestic programs. American forces would be stretched
thin around the world, though the troop requirements estimated by
McNamara and Westmoreland in 1965 suggested it would be possible
to fi ght the war and pursue the Great Society simultaneously.
Besides declining to ask Congress to endorse large-scale military
intervention, Johnson preferred not to test public support for his
decision. No public announcement accompanied the beginning of
Rolling Th under, so it appeared at fi rst to be no more than an extension
of the earlier pattern of retaliatory raids. As early as April 1965 the
president approved the wider use of Westmoreland’s Marines in
off ensive operations. Again he issued no statement. After the change
became public in a low-key press release two months later and attracted
some worried editorial comment, administration dissembling
continued. Th e White House claimed that there had been no change in
the mission of U.S. ground forces. More remarkably, when Johnson
in late July 1965 approved the large-scale commitment of ground forces
in Vietnam, he announced his action at a midday press conference at