222 e lusive v ictories
beyond the guerrilla phase. Th e task now fell to arriving American con-
ventional troops.
Th ey would fi nd themselves up against a complex political-military
challenge. American troops faced an enemy who was more familiar
with the terrain and adept at camoufl age, and who could seek sanctuary
in places ruled off -limits to American forces. Th ey would need to take
care, too, not to alienate the population from the Saigon government.
Similarly, American aircraft would be expected to disrupt heavily
defended enemy supply eff orts while operating within tight constraints
laid down for political reasons. Johnson’s decisions not to mobilize
reserves and to limit the tour of duty in Vietnam to one year posed
further challenges. American units would be forced to cope with inex-
perience and high turnover, both damaging to unit cohesion,
throughout the confl ict.
That lack of cohesion spread to the highest ranks. Lincoln had
struggled to put together a military team to realize his purposes; iden-
tifying commanders in tune with their objectives quickly was the good
fortune of both Wilson and Roosevelt. Johnson stepped into a situation
of poor civil-military relations at the Pentagon that fed ongoing ten-
sions between top civilian advisors and their counterparts in uniform.
He found himself sharply at odds with his military chiefs, quickly cre-
ating a poisonous climate that destroyed mutual confi dence.
Friction at the Pentagon dated back to Kennedy’s selection of Robert
McNamara as secretary of defense. With a reputation for both bril-
liance and arrogance, McNamara arrived to fi nd a Defense Department
mired in outdated management practices and stale strategic thinking.
He promptly introduced new management systems, including rigorous
reviews of new and proposed weapons systems for cost eff ectiveness,
which antagonized old Pentagon hands. He and his civilian assistants
showed no greater sympathy for how uniformed commanders
approached military problems. Evidently persuaded of the old adage
that generals prepare for the last war, McNamara and company turned
instead to academic strategists for guidance in how to meet current
military threats. Th e Kennedy administration had to prod the military
to take seriously the challenge of low-level national liberation struggles.
(Army Chief of Staff General George H. Decker was ousted quickly
after he expressed a dismissive view of guerilla warfare, and Kennedy