228 e lusive v ictories
moving to the third phase, a general off ensive to topple the Saigon gov-
ernment, which they were eager to accomplish before American troops
might arrive in signifi cant numbers. (See map 4.1)
Th e United States escalated its military eff ort in time to forestall
what seemed an imminent communist triumph, but American forces
arrived to fi nd themselves engaged in a multitiered struggle. In villages
and hamlets, U.S. troops would need to mount a counterinsurgency
campaign against communist guerillas and their political infrastructure,
competing for the support of the population, “winning hearts and
minds.” Simultaneously, American troops would attempt to reverse
enemy gains in conventional warfare. Since the communist forces in
South Vietnam relied heavily on reinforcement and resupply from the
North, moreover, the United States needed to interdict the communist
lines of communication, disrupt enemy sanctuaries, and raise the cost
of supporting the war so that Hanoi would cease the eff ort and nego-
tiate. Breaking the North-South communist link, American com-
manders believed, depended on an eff ective bombing campaign.
Presidents typically exercise their greatest discretion early in a mil-
itary confl ict. Over time, as the cumulative weight of their decisions
makes it harder to shift direction, they lose the capacity to shape the
course of events. Lincoln represented a partial exception because he
redefi ned war goals when he embraced emancipation. Roosevelt, on the
other hand, made his most important decisions—ranging from rati-
fying the Germany First grand strategy to his insistence on operations
in North Africa and his support for the Marines on Guadalcanal—
during the fi rst year after Pearl Harbor. Where Lincoln, Wilson, and
Roosevelt all took care to preserve their freedom of action upon going
to war, Johnson surrendered his, evidently with little refl ection. Instead
he simply took in stride the limits on American operational fl exibility
that derived from assumptions about Chinese behavior and how much
guns and butter Congress would buy at the same time. He further tied
his hands when, for the sake of the Great Society, he decided not to put
the nation on a war footing.
Th us, although on paper a confl ict between the United States and
the Vietnamese communists appeared a mismatch, politics helped even
the odds. Overruling the military, the president and key civilian advisors
rejected a number of military actions deemed too infl ammatory to the