s taying the c ourse 229Soviet Union or China. The administration barred the mining of
Haiphong harbor, the key port for the delivery of Soviet munitions, for
fear that the sinking of a Soviet vessel with signifi cant casualties might
force Moscow to respond in Vietnam or elsewhere. American aircraft
would also stay well clear of the China–North Vietnam border. Further
bombing limitations refl ected a concern for public relations: American
offi cials believed air raids on major population centers on the scale of
the World War II strategic bombing of German and Japanese cities
would alienate public opinion at home or abroad. Th e administration
also worried that extending the war into Laos to block the Ho Chi
Minh Trail or into Cambodia to disrupt communist sanctuaries would
be overly provocative, especially since the United States had recently
agreed to assure Laos its neutrality.
Military manpower ceilings represented the other key limitation on
the American war eff ort. Because the president decided against the
mobilization of reserves, the war would be fought within tight per-
sonnel constraints. Th e initial 1965 approval for a major increase in
U.S. forces in South Vietnam meant Westmoreland would receive the
troops he needed to halt communist advances plus enough to take the
off ensive in 1966. But as he asked (with JCS endorsement) for more
men, his new requests ran up against competing American military
obligations elsewhere around the world, especially to NATO in Europe
and in South Korea. Th e military leadership soon expressed alarm that
U.S. forces were stretched too thin. Other nations, including South
Korea, Taiwan, and Australia, sent troops to South Vietnam to
augment the American commitment, but the administration could ask
only so much of these allies; other Western powers refused to support
the war eff ort. As an added complication, maintaining a large mil-
itary force on the far side of the globe required a major logistical estab-
lishment, so a high percentage of American forces in Southeast Asia
consisted of support personnel who did no fi ghting. American and
ARVN combat troops accordingly enjoyed at best a modest numerical
advantage over their adversaries, though they also had much greater
fi repower and mobility.
From the outset of the Rolling Th under bombing campaign against
the DRV, the president’s military and civilian advisors split over policy.
Civilian offi cials regarded bombing both as a military tool to hamper