230 e lusive v ictories
North Vietnamese support for communist forces attacking South
Vietnam and as a means to pressure Hanoi to negotiate. Under close
civilian oversight, the attacks increased in scale and frequency over a
number of months. Ratcheting up the pressure, it was felt, sent a signal
to the enemy that worse would come if he refused to discuss ending his
effort to destroy South Vietnamese independence. Military leaders
rejected this logic and called for an all-out campaign to block supply
eff orts, including attacks that would impede the fl ow of materials into
the DRV from China and the Soviet Union. Gradual escalation, more-
over, let the enemy adjust to each increment of violence, neutralizing its
psychological impact. Th e North Vietnamese also gained ample time to
strengthen their air defenses around likely targets, with a resulting
increase in U.S. aircraft and pilot losses.
McNamara and other civilian advisors quickly concluded that
bombing would never accomplish more than to limit enemy infil-
tration. As the civilian side saw it, evidence failed to substantiate mil-
itary assertions that lifting most target restrictions would severely
impair the communist resupply eff ort. Civilian offi cials also worried
over the negative publicity the bombing attracted. Despite restrictions
to avoid hitting densely populated areas, air raids killed and maimed
noncombatants and destroyed nonmilitary targets, and the North Viet-
namese made sure these mistakes were publicized. Popular sensibilities
had changed in the generation since Dresden and Hiroshima, too, and
world opinion recoiled from the destruction. Last, as in the Second
World War, bombing seemed to harden the resolve of enemy civilians
and bolster their support for the Hanoi leadership. ^
Civilian-military discord also erupted over the frequent bombing
pauses the administration imposed as part of its diplomatic eff orts.
Sometimes the pauses would be accompanied by very public diplomatic
overtures designed to show American willingness to seek a peace
agreement. Each pause angered American military commanders, who
pointed out that the communists used the opportunity to increase their
rate of reinforcement and resupply to the South. Th e JCS also main-
tained that the enemy would interpret these halts as evidence that the
United States lacked the will to win. Rather than make gestures to
induce the North Vietnamese to meet at the conference table, General
Wheeler argued, the tempo of air operations should be increased. A n d