232 e lusive v ictories
VC cadres for intelligence and supplies.) In 1967, with pacifi cation
stalled, Robert Komer, a senior civilian offi cial, was placed in charge of
the eff ort. But his abrasive personal style put off Americans and South
Vietnamese alike and he accomplished little.
To defeat regular VC/NVA forces, Westmoreland pursued a strategy
of attrition. Attrition presumes greater military resources than the
adversary possesses, so combat erodes his fi ghting power and eventually
forces him to recognize that he cannot prevail by military means. West-
moreland believed U.S. troops, backed by massive air support and
enjoying far superior fi repower, could destroy the combat eff ectiveness
of VC and NVA regular (or “mainforce”) units whenever these were
brought to battle. Because the elusive enemy avoided fi ghting on terms
the Americans preferred, it would be necessary for American troops to
engage in “search-and-destroy” operations to fi nd and eliminate him.
Th e savage encounter in the Ia Drang Valley in November 1965 pointed
to what Westmoreland intended: some 300 Americans were killed but
infl icted roughly fi ve times as many communist deaths.
Th e search-and-destroy approach promised to be both costly and
time-consuming. American troops would have to operate on terrain
chosen by communist troops to help nullify American technological
advantages. Th e enemy could often avoid contact when tactical circum-
stances placed him at a disadvantage. Still, U.S. military commanders
believed that, with determination and suffi cient patience, the mathe-
matics of attrition would work in favor of the U.S., South Vietnamese,
and allied forces. In his initial assessment of his force needs in summer
1965, General Westmoreland estimated that if given the manpower he
requested, he could blunt the tide of communist success by the end of
the year, move to the off ensive during the next eighteen months, and
clean out remaining enemy sanctuaries over the following year—a time-
table that placed success in the summer of 1968.
An insoluble tension existed, however, between the geographic
constraints imposed on American military operations and Westmore-
land’s attrition strategy. Attrition fails when the enemy can replenish his
losses. Since Washington had decided against ground operations in Laos
and Cambodia, these served as sanctuaries into which the enemy could
retreat under pressure, safe from pursuit. Communist forces decided
when to enter combat and when to exit the battlefi eld, a fact that soon